Understanding the Causes of Injuries

By Phil La Duke

Perhaps the most over-looked step in making the workplace safer is an understanding of the nature of injuries.  It sounds simple—after all, isn’t this all just common sense? The nature of injuries may seem pretty obvious, but when you consider the many factors that can lead to injuries, things can get pretty confusing, pretty fast..

The nature of injuries has been the source of conjecture, competing systems, and bitter feuds since the industrial revolution.  For many years worker injuries were seen as an unavoidable cost of doing business.  Farmers got kicked by mules, miners were killed in cave-ins, sailors drowned, and metal workers burned to death; that’s just the way it was and nobody gave it much thought.

As business grew more organized and experts looked for ways to make operations run more smoothly attitudes toward workplace safety changed, albeit slowly. But it wasn’t until the Triangle Shirt Waste Company fire, and to a lesser extent the publication of Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, that any substantive call for government regulation of safety.

On December 29, 1970 the U.S. Government formed the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) and in the ensuing years most people viewed safety as something someone does many, if not most, took the view that if people would be more careful they wouldn’t get hurt as much. It made sense then, and it makes sense now.  This belief set was further bolstered when the National Safety Council released its finding that something like 95% of all injuries were caused by unsafe behaviors.  It all feels pretty reasonable, it all makes so much sense, and yet it’s wrong.

Before the dullards blast my in-box, yes, I will grant you that BBS is a science, if you will grant me that so are eugenics, phrenology, cryptozology, parapsychology and a host of other fad and fringe fields are also sciences in that they use the scientific method and controls and all the other criteria for one to claim such a designation.  Sufficed to say, we have struggled under the misconception that we understand the nature of injuries when in fact, we do not.

That’s not to say that some injuries aren’t caused by reckless jackasses who act with wanton disrespect for the safety of themselves or others, but those incidents are, in my opinion rare.

Human Error

People screw up. They don’t choose to, they don’t want to, but they do. We live in an imperfect world and despite our best intentions some things go awry. We can’t truly prevent human error but we can work to protect people from the consequences of their mistakes.

Process Incapability

Often variability in our processes—both mechanical and human behaviors—can create hazards that hurt people. By having tighter controls on our processes we can often prevent these issues from becoming injuries, but as with human error we must also look to manage the risk of injury through the hierarchy of controls.

Risk Taking

A big contributor to worker injuries is risk taking.  We WANT people to take some risks (for example, a worker who violates a process in order to prevent an explosion) we just don’t want them taking unjustifiable risks or taking risks without understanding the jeopardy in which they are placed by taking these risks.  People will always take shortcuts, and unless we can train them in risk assessment and help them to make better judgments we can never hope to offer any protection against disaster.
Equipment Failure

Tools wear out and break sending shrapnel into the work place, grinding wheels crumble into pieces and fling stone at the heads of workers, and saw blades fail and go flying who knows where.  These scenes play out in the workplace daily and scarce little thought is given to these events.  A good Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) program can lower the risk both by making the failures easier to predict and allowing maintenance to change tooling before it fails.


For some, exposure issues are more environmental hygiene issues than safety issues, but in my book, if it can hurt workers then it’s a safety issues. Exposure is sometimes difficult to control because too often we only become aware of the issue when it too late to avoid the damage done through exposure.

Ergonomic Stress

As with exposure issues, ergonomic issues can be hard to spot.  Ergonomic injuries develop over time and injury occurs only after a threshold has been crossed.  These injuries tend to be serious and costly to treat.  Ergonomic injuries can be avoided by implementing a robust ergonomics program.

Poor Housekeeping

Perhaps the most common cause of injuries, near misses, and first aid cases is also the easiest to correct: poor housekeeping.  Poor housekeeping contributes to human error, makes risk taking essential, and can create everything from trip hazards to exposure risk.  A solid 5S initiative can prevent many housekeeping issues.

Nonstandard Work/Working Out of Station

Whenever we work outside the intended standard—whether it be because of part shortages, increased or decreased production, or simply workers working out of the designated work area.  This creates a situation that the people who designed the process never intended and perhaps never anticipated when they laid out the work area and associated protections.  This type of hazard must be tightly managed not only to protect the workers, but also to ensure quality and efficiency.

This list is neither exhaustive nor equally applicable to all workplaces; safety professionals need to take a hard look at the environments for which they are responsible—no external consultant or safety system provider is likely to know the hazards of your workplace as well as you do.

As long as safety management systems focus too heavily on one cause of safety while downplaying the others as less important, we will never make a sustainable improvement in worker safety.



#equipment-failure, #ergonomic-stress, #exposure, #human-error, #nonstandard-workworking-out-of-station, #poor-housekeeping, #process-incapability, #risk-taking, #worker-safety

What Are The Alternatives to Behavior Based Safety

By Phil La Duke


Last week I posted yet another criticism of Behavior Based Safety (BBS) and it drew the following comment

“Good morning Phil I hope all is well. The argument for and against Behavior-Based Safety is as old as the first implemented methodologies, yet it still persists in many different beneficial and strange forms. Some refer to incentive schemes as BBS, others just a psychology-based approach as BBS and others watch a video, read an article and attempt to make it work with widely ranging results on culture and performance. I believe BBS to be a situationally-appropriate tool for a small aspect of safety. Moreover, it should be a tool focused on better understanding performance and the influences on it, than an awareness or accountability mechanism. The latter tends to cause some of the problems you write about and I have seen as well. Rather than perpetuating the continuous critique, I would sincerely be interested in reviewing the specifics of the methodology/approach/tool you propose that will accomplish the same results in the small aspect of safety BBS benefits. Would you please share?”

This isn’t the first time I’ve been asked to share the alternatives to BBS. But this is no easy feat—first of all, as this comment suggests, there is far from a single source of truth that defines BBS and its elements. Before we can discuss the relative effectiveness of BBS we need to agree as to exactly what constitutes “effectiveness” of a safety management system.  The criteria I will use are:

  • Cost
  • Effort
  • Sustainability
  • Value

Most of the purveyors of BBS agree that the following are elements of a comprehensive Behavioral Safety management system:

  • Evaluation of Worker Behavior Using Checklists.

Trying to find a competitive system involves some modification of the behavioral observation.  Personally, I reject the idea that people get hurt because they knowingly and consciously behave in ways that put them in jeopardy.  I am supported in this belief by Joseph T. Hallinan, author of the book Why We Make Mistakes: How We Look Without Seeing, Forget Things In Seconds, and Are All Pretty Sure We Are Well Above Average; David Marx author of Whack A Mole—The Price We Pay For Expecting Perfection; and Zachary Shore the author of Blunder: Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions. Putting this philosophic difference aside, conducting periodic reviews of the work area that focuses on all the hazards instead of focusing on purely (or even chiefly on) behaviors is far more likely to lower the risk of process failures which not only endanger workers but also puts quality, through-put, and production at risk. What alternative is there to BBS? Several tools come to mind:

  1. Layered Process Audits. Layered Process Audits are checks conducted by various levels of management.  The primary purpose is to ensure that the process as performed conforms to the process requirements. Part of the Layered Process Audit system is the verification that all mistake proofing protections are in place and operational.  This is essentially an improved version of the behavioral observations that requires less effort, is far less costly, is relatively easy to sustain, and ultimately returns far more value than the behavioral observation.
  2. Kaizen Events. Kaizen events are ad hoc activities designed to improve the efficiency of the work area. Kaizen events involve the workers in the area who participate in improvements by identifying and eliminating sources of waste—including those things that are likely to cause injuries.
  3. 3.    5S Audits. 5S is a powerful tool designed to reduce process variation and make the work area more efficient and safer. It involves simple workplace reorganization that sorts, sets in order, scours, standardizes, and sustains improvements in the workplace.

Data Collection From Observations. Behavior Based Safety systems rely on measurements taken by watching workers perform their jobs.  While safety information should be routinely analyzed and trends should be studied to determine proactive initiatives, here again BBS falls short.  First, in an attempt to overcome Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle (which states the observation itself alters the factors being observed) BBS depends on many observationsTo achieve the desired number of observations BBS system relies on numerous  trained observers who observe their peers and provide them feedback on their behaviors.  Such activities rarely normalize the data to adjust for the Hawthorn Effect (the tendency for workers to improve simply because the organization is taking action).  Data collection relative to safety indicators are key to constructing a coherent safety strategy, but again, there are better (as it relates to Cost, Effort, Sustainability and Value). Let’s take each of these factors one at a time.  The cost of conducting observations are substantial—checklists must be constructed, workers must be trained both in evaluating and being evaluated, and the observers must be paid a wage to conduct the assessment—the effort (for the same reasons) is onerous; and the long-term sustainability of these activities is dubious.  Add to this the resentment and morale issues (up to and including Union drives or labor unrest) associated with peer-to-peer audits and you have a really bureaucratic system that creates head count and saps productivity. A far better solution is the balanced score card.   According to http://www.balancedscorecard.org/BSCResources/AbouttheBalancedScorecard/tabid/55/Default.aspx the balanced scorecard is “a strategic planning and management system … It was originated by Drs. Robert Kaplan (Harvard Business School) and David Norton as a performance measurement framework that gave managers and executives a more ‘balanced’ view of organizational performance.”  General Electric, hailed by many as a pioneer of modern management, was an early adopter of the balanced scorecard approach

Modern balanced scorecards has evolved beyond being a simple performance measurement system and has blossomed into to a strategic tool for planning and managing a business; it provides a visual representation of the progress against strategic initiatives.  Typically the balanced scorecard provides a framework for achieving goals in Safety, Quality, Delivery, Morale, and Environment (SQDCM). In addition to the obvious advantage of leveraging existing efforts and collaborating across multiple functions, the balanced scorecard imbeds safety into standard operating procedures—instead of acting as if safety was a discrete element it is rightfully treated as a pillar on which an effective organization is built.

  • Worker participation. An oft-cited reason for the “success” of BBS that it fully engages the workforce in safety management. Proponents of BBS extoll the virtues of this grass roots approach as opposed to a management driven top-down approach.  Many systems include incentives for making the workplace safer—safety BINGOs, bonuses for injury-free quarters, or similar initiatives.  A more economical, holistic approach is to use existing employee suggestion programs to solicit and reward ideas that genuinely improve the safety of the workplace.  It may not be sexy, but why create a parallel process that is limited solely to worker safety when a larger, more inclusive system already exists?
  • Focus On Specific Unsafe Behaviors.  BBS proponents tout the relatively scarce types of behaviors that cause the majority of injuries.  Here I believe that this is not in fact, BBS.  This is an attempt to use process based safety tools to address a shortcoming of BBS.  But let’s take a quick look at the practice of using Pareto chart analyses to target the behaviors of greatest risk. Pareto charts track quantitative (counted) data and not qualitative (measured) data.  This kind of data is generally (but not necessarily) derived from Area Maps or Body Maps.  Since the severity of the event is not collected in Pareto analysis (the data is assumed to be more or less the same severity and holds more or less the same risk of injury) it is inappropriate to use this data in determining the critical few behaviors that represent the greatest danger.  Furthermore, this type of analysis essentially ignores hazards that are largely environmental, organizational, or mechanical.  Instead of this approach organizations should focus on ALL hazards instead of focusing on behaviors.
  • Focused Feedback Performance.  In BBS feedback usually takes one of three forms: feedback at the time of observation; graphs of trends used in weekly discussion with work crews, and monthly discussions about safety by management.   While feedback on behavior is valuable it only can provide benefit in cases where the behavior was deliberate.  A large percentage of unsafe behavior is simple human error and no amount of feedback will change the fact that people make mistakes.  Another substantial source of unsafe behavior is behavioral drift (the tendency to slowly move away from the standard procedure until one unknowingly moves into risky behavior).  According to David Marx (in his book Whack A Mole: The Price We Pay For Expecting Perfection) contends that drift is an unavoidable part of human behavior.  Here again, telling someone that they drifted isn’t all that useful in changing worker behavior.  Finally, there is reckless behavior (defined as the willing choice to behave in a way so risky that no reasonable person could ever defend the behavior as in proportion to the perceived reward.) In cases of recklessness feedback on the behavior is unlikely to result in behavioral improvement.  Instead of focused feedback on behavior organizations would be far better served by implementing a Just Culture approach to safety combined with training in decision-making and a comprehensive program of error proofing.
  • Data-driven decision-making. How is this a differentiator of BBS? Aren’t all safety management system based, at least to some degree, based on data-driven decision making? Clearly making the decisions on data that is primarily based on behavioral data at the expense of other relative factors is not something to brag about.
  • Requires visible on-going support from managers and front-line supervision. Here again, this is not something limited to BBS. (And a contradiction with BBS’s claim that its success is rooted in the commitment of the workers and a grass-roots movement.) If managers and front-line supervision aren’t supportive of safety it will most certainly fail irrespective if it is a BBS, process based, continuous improvement, or Just Culture approach.. But in all cases I think this is a cop-out.  A good safety system should begin by engaging leadership before it starts laying out commandments.  When I custom-design a safety system I begin by assessing the leadership’s commitment to making the changes necessary to effect lasting change.  If I am not satisfied that this commitment exists I walk away. In my one-year engagements I have completely transformed cultures and produced for my customers sustainable and effective safety systems that they own without creating a parasitic relationship between vendor and customer.

This is just the tip of the iceberg—I didn’t even touch the many companies who make money by certifying people to perpetuate their crappy safety systems, sell “training materials” or dozens of trademarked consumable add-ons that end up unnecessarily costing the customer tens of thousands of dollars annually.

Did you like this post? Did you find it helpful? Was it thought provoking? Why not share it with your peers? I think they would appreciate it and I certainly would.

Is Behavior Based Safety The Safety Equivalent of Lobotomies?

By Phil La Duke

Edison wasted so much time trying to discredit alternating current that he missed out on potentially making more remarkable discoveries.

Last week I posted another criticism of Behavior Based Safety (BBS) and was deluged with another predictable wave of “you don’t know what you’re talking about” emails and a fair number of positive comments.  One comment that was sort of in between:  “I have never been a big fan of BBS but I think you are guilty of doing something similar to what you accuse its proponents of doing – making claims without research or statistics to back it up.” I think that is a fair challenge to make, but I can assure you of two things: 1) I don’t make up research or claims that cannot be supported by research.  There are already too many things on the internet that some crackpot made up and promulgated for one dubious purpose or another; and 2) I am not writing a research paper here.  A blog is an opinion piece, so while I may reference research in a vague way don’t look for me to post a bibliography at the end of my posts.  Rest assured I do not claim as my own, ideas and research that are the intellectual property of another, but you can write your own damned term papers.  I will always make it a point to identify things that are my opinions from that which is the work or opinions of another.  I have around 35 peer-reviewed i.e. works that are acceptable as a source that can be cited in academic works, and links are provided for those works so those of you wishing to use my work as a source should reference those works.

So in the interest of citing my sources, I am reading Blunder, Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions by Zachary Shore and his views and research on the factors that influence human decision making and resultant behavior have profound implications for worker safety and (in my opinion) create a scathing indictment of BBS at a foundational level.

Let me begin by stating that my principal concerns with BBS lie less with the methodology and tools than it does with the fanatical devotion BBS proponents tend to exhibit to the approach and their unwillingness to address any of the BBS weaknesses (accept to say that either the organization in question was misapplying BBS, or to add more complexity to an already unduly concept system.

I have long accused the BBS apologists of defending junk-science for the sole purpose of lining their pockets.  I have called them charlatans and snake oil salesmen and while I have met BBS purveyors who were just that, most of the BBS proponents aren’t deliberately promoting hogwash and jeopardizing workers to make money (in fairness to me, they have called me far worse, but that is just me being a baby.)

So why cling to something that is increasingly suspect? Dr. Shore begins his book with the story of Thomas Edison.  You may remember Thomas Edison as the inventor of the phonograph, the light bulb, and a host of other inventions that literally changed the world.  Some of you may also be aware of Edison’s personal campaign against alternating current (AC) as the best way to get electrical power to the places people needed it most.  Edison worked hard to discredit the work of his one-time protégé Nikola Tesla.  Despite overwhelming evidence that AC power was far superior, Edison sought to discredit it and Tesla. (Tesla didn’t help his case much by being a nutcase in his own right).  Edison wasted time, money, and resources battling a competitive approach—instead of inventing new and exciting tools, Edison focused his energy (no pun intended) on destroying someone else’s work.  I suppose one could argue that this is what I do when I criticize BBS, but I don’t want to destroy it, rather fix the gaping holes endemic to it. Shore uses Edison to illustrate a cognitive trap.  Edison was so convinced in the “rightness” of his beliefs that he spent an inordinate amount of effort to destroy any competitive theory.  I think there is a lot of this in BBS.

One of the most intriguing ideas that Shore explores is the idea of causefusion, the act of attributing causation to instances where there is only correlation.  In other words oversimplifying research that shows correlation to demonstrate (erroneously) causation.  Shore uses, numerous examples, but points to the fact that nutritionists will find a correlation between eating a particular food and extrapolating that a nutrient contained in high concentrations in a food would have the same effect in supplement form.  For example, eating foods high in beta carotene reduces the risk of cancer, therefore taking beta carotene supplements must also reduce the risk of cancer.  Studies (and if you want to know which ones, call Shore) have shown that this is untrue and in some cases the opposite is true.  I see this at the root of much of the defensiveness about BBS.  Some time ago, the National Safety Council did research that showed that upwards of 90% of all injuries had some behavioral element.  That study was quickly accepted as gospel and entrepreneurs just as quickly set out to develop solutions based on the fact that 90% of all injuries were caused by unsafe behaviors; this is causefusion—the initial research made no claim to causation; scare few research finding do, rather the study only showed a correlation, i.e. a relationship between two factors. Shore argues that cause fusion tends to make a single cause that is easy to explain (for example, unsafe behavior) appealing when the reality is that the cause is systemic and complex. In support of his argument, he quotes Harvard paleontologist and essayist, Stephen Jay Gould. In the 1990s Gould warned against the new belief that genetics could explain everything. “We naturally favor, and tend to overextend exciting novelties in vain hope that they may provide general solutions or panaceas when such contributions really constitute more modest albeit vital pieces of a much complex puzzle.” BBS is hardly a novelty to safety professionals, but it can be to many Operations professionals and I think this is an apt quote.

In Why We Make Mistakes: How we Look Without Seeing, Forget Things in Seconds, and Are All Pretty Sure We Are Way Above Average Joseph T. Hallinan argues that our biases shape so much of what we believe and how we decide that the idea of free will is almost doubtful.  He argues that we learn so little from our experience because we attribute causation to the wrong things. In other words, we begin to seek out things that support what we already believe rather than trying to learn new things.

On the other hand, in The Human Brain Book An Illustrated Guide To Its Structure, Function, and Disorders Rita Carter points out that while phrenology (the study of personality by studying the bumps on people’s head) has long been ridiculed as quackery and lobotomies (damaging or removing portions of the frontal lobe of people suffering from mental disorders) are now regarded as barbaric both practices offered real benefits—phrenology was the first recognition that parts of the brain controlled different things, and U.K. studies of people who had lobotomies showed that 41% of those who had lobotomies were either cured or greatly improved while only 4% were judged to be worse off then before the procedure.  This feeds and supports that our biases tend to impede our judgment (I admit, not exactly an earth-shattering revelation).  Many elements within BBS are valuable, but as BBS fanatics continue to dismiss criticisms we run the serious risk that the valuable elements will lost as more and more organizations see BBS as the new phrenology/lobotomy.

As long as people keep defending BBS as the single greatest approach to worker safety—without allowing for the fact that there may be a better way, or at very least a cheaper and less complex way of achieving the same results.

Did you enjoy this blog? Did you find it thought provoking? Why not share it on Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn or by sending it to friends and colleagues via email.  I would sure appreciated it and I’m sure they would too.

#bbs-fanatics, #behavior-based-safety, #lobotomy, #phrenology

My column, The Safe Side just hit the digital newsstand in the June-July issue ofFabricating and Metalworking magazine.  I hope you will check it out and comment on it in the magazine or here.

A Day in the Life of an Ergonomist


#ergonomist, #fabricating-metalworking, #safety, #the-safe-side, #worker-safety

Is BBS just BS?

By Phil La Duke

Recently I was contacted by a student who is earning his degree in preparation for a career in Environmental Health & Safety.  He was given an assignment during his internship to research why Unions oppose Behavior Based Safety (BBS). It seems that in preparing for the assignment he happened across some of my writings that are critical of BBS and he wanted to know why I was so critical of BBS when so much of what I criticized would never be a part of what he was taught was not part of an “effective BBS program”.

First of all, I must applaud the young man for contacting me and asking me to defend my point of view.  I find that the on-going polarization in the debate in safety makes it rare that anyone actually seeks out opposing points of view; it would have been much easier to denounce me as uninformed, a nut, or provocative for provocation’s sake.  That having been said, I was alarmed that so many professors are still teaching BBS as undisputed fact.  This young man described me as one of the few opponents of BBS  he could find.  This is troubling on several levels.  I know of a growing number of people who are increasingly disenchanted with BBS but they openly tell me that they will not publicly criticize it because of the fanatics who shout down all other opinions or research that does not support their world view. In my writing, I admit that I have used very basic criticism of BBS because most people don’t even understand this very rudimentary criticism.

I believe (and I am not by any means alone in this) that BBS is inherently flawed; it’s a dead technology—even in its current state.  Its foundation is based on the erroneous and misleading statistic that 95% of injuries is caused by unsafe behavior.  Most experts that I know doubt the methodology that drew this conclusion. Along the same lines, the methodology Heinrich used to build his pyramid was species and is generally thought to be little more than one man’s opinion (that he reached after asking supervisors for their opinion with no scientific method to back up). Heinrich’s theories are on the periphery of BBS, but I believe there are substantial parallels in methodology.  Anecdotal data isn’t reliable.  Before you cite further studies, I will tell you that I have no respect for research conducted by companies and pundits who have billions in revenue at stake.  How likely are we to ever see the findings should the research prove that BBS is bunk?  I understand the argument that I have criticized older methods; I have heard that over and over again. But given that any criticism I make on a basic level draws, “that’s not the way we do BBS anymore” I remain unmoved. This response is like someone telling me the reason I don’t like eating squirrel and opossum anuses is because I just haven’t had them cooked right. After a while it gets to be like hitting a moving target…forgive me if I don’t continue to seek out the perfectly cooked and seasoned squirrel anus.

And despite the apparently underground outpouring of support for BBS, critics persist. Many companies famous for advocating BBS continue to be accused of encouraging under-reporting of injuries.  BP was once the shining example of BBS successes, do I really have to trot out its safety record?

Too many people continue to make corrections to there BBS as it fails; it’s flawed. It’s time to move past it, salvage what works, and discard the rest.

In other writings, I’ve said the following before, but just to be clear:

  • BBS is based on behavior modification.  When I say this, I either get one of two responses: “so what?” or “you’re over simplifying it”. Most behavior modification experiments ignore how people behave in populations, and safety is about how populations behave, not individuals. Nobody has ever satisfactorily answered this criticism and generally dismiss the statement by telling me that I don’t know what I am taking about.  Illuminate me.
  • People make mistakes; it’s a biological fact.  The reason people make mistakes is NOT because they are being careless. Current theory on mistake making is that the brain deliberately causes us to subconsciously test the safety of adapting by making little experiments.  Sometimes we call them discoveries and sometimes we call them mistakes.  All the observations, and reminders, and training, and all elements of BBS will not change the fact that people make mistakes, but we spend a fortune trying to; it’s misguided.
  • People take risks, and that’s a good thing.  People get up in the morning, they drive to work, they take short cuts, they take risks.  Taking risks are a necessary part of the workplace and BBS tends to pretend that it isn’t.  We need to do a better job of training workers to take risks appropriately and stop telling them to not take risks when we know that they will.
  • People wander away from the standards.  As we perform routine tasks we drift from the standard, BBS tries to address this, but does so amateurishly and ham-fistedly that it is difficult to take it seriously. Basic exercises designed to teach the difficulty in maintaining a standard easily demonstrate the impossibility of sticking to a standard when faced with variability in human behavior.
  • There needs to be a greater focus on protecting people from mistakes. Instead of trying to shape behaviors, organizations should manage the things that tend to cause people to make more mistakes. This approach would not only improve safety but would also improve productivity and quality and other factors as well.
  • One-Size Does Not Fit All.  BBS tends to take a one-size-fits approach, there isn’t an industry, environment, or population that the fanatics won’t claim that BBS is the answer, often before they even know the question.

All that being said, I think that there are elements of BBS that can be useful, but not as long as fanatics keep proselytizing BBS at all costs. There is such a strong population who will not listen to anything that does not proclaim the sanctity of BBS that most of the critics of BBS (and there are lots of us) have stopped talking.

Did you enjoy this blog? Did you find it thought provoking? Why not share it on Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn or by sending it to friends and colleagues via email.  I would sure appreciated it and I’m sure they would too.

#bbs, #flaws-of-behavior-based-safety, #safety, #worker-safety