Phil La Duke's Blog

Fresh perspectives on safety and Performance Improvement

Your Only As Good—and Safe—As Your Process


by Phil La Duke

Several weeks ago I posted an article that asked you to take a new look at safety. I asked you to consider that safety isn’t something that happens to workers or that doesn’t happen to workers, rather it is an indicator of the efficiency and effectiveness of one of five basic business elements: competency, process capability, management of hazards and risk, accountability, and engagement. In that post I explored the relationship between competency and safe outcomes, and in this week’s post I would like to continue to explore safe outcomes as they pertain to process capability.

I should begin by precisely defining exactly what I mean by process capability. Process capability is the extent to which a process (i.e. an activity designed to produce a predictable desired outcome) as practiced varies from the specification. Your process is not deliberately designed to harm workers so by definition something has gone wrong when someone is injured. Process variability is seen as the principle enemy to efficiency by most process improvement; variability is deviation from the standard and this deviation means that the process is less predictable; the greater the variability the more unpredictable the results and the more hazardous the process.

There is variability in every process; even robots and the best automated equipment are incapable of returning the exact same result in every instance. Typically machine and equipment performance measured in its ability to meet specific limits. Statistical Process Control (SPC) is a discipline developed to improve process reliability (how consistently it performs within control limits) these and other tools can improve process capability and create safe outcomes.

There are obvious things that we can do to improve process capability. For starters, we can develop Standard Work Instructions (SWI). According to the Lean Institute, “Standardized work is one of the most powerful but least used lean tools.” Standard Work involves identifying and documenting the current best practice. In so doing, the organization can identify a) differences between how the work is actually performed and how it was designed, b) the safest way to do the job, and c) identify and document continuous improvements.

Once you have created SWIs you have the means to properly train new employees, evaluate the performance and skill level of existing employees and as I mentioned in the first in this series people who have the skills to do the job are better able to do it safely and correctly. What’s more SWIs allow worker input into workplace improvements. So many organizations have invested in half-baked safety systems that pay workers to watch other people work and provide feedback, why not have them do something productive instead, like…I don’t know…develop Safe Work Instructions?

Standard Work Instructions are more than merely operating instructions, but my intent here is not to give free consulting in Lean Principles. Sufficed to say that investing in standard work improves not only your process but produces safer outcomes. Standardized work isn’t just for manufacturing—it can be applied to everything from driving to dry cleaning—but it is seldom used for non-manufacturing processes even in manufacturing, which is disappointing. Too often organizations resist standardizing non-production work by claiming that it is too difficult. If that were truly the case than how do we ever train anyone to do it?

In my experience a fair amount of workers will resist the very concept of Standardized Work, once when I was teaching a workshop in standardized work one worker indignantly told me that nobody was gonna tell him where he was going to put his (expletive) toolbox. So it’s not that easy to implement standards, of course, I was able to turn it around and win him over by telling him that he was going to tell US where his toolbox should go.

Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) is another great tool for influencing safe outcomes, while the snake oil salesmen will tell you that you don’t need to invest in capital, machines wear out, technology advances, and the design, care, and appropriate maintenance of your equipment is essential. It is outright stupid to believe that you can keep workers safe using outdated, poorly functioning, and wildly unpredictable equipment and, for that matter, battered and crumbling facilities.

Another Lean tool that has a direct influence on safer outputs is 5S, but then I’ve already written ad nauseum on the relationship between workplace organization/housekeeping and its relationship to workplace safety, and given the criticisms of late that I tend to repeat myself, I won’t go into here.

All the best tools and robust processes are of little value, however, if no one follows them. The second element that you have to consider in how process capability influences safer outcomes is “process discipline”, that is, the extent to which people work within the process. We tend to construct safety controls based on what people are supposed to do, and often forget that what happens on paper isn’t necessarily what happens in the workplace. As variable as equipment can be, this variation pales in comparison to the variability of human behavior. No amount of training, hackneyed theories, or the dubious claims from soft-headed safety gurus will change the fact that human behavior is incredibly complex, unpredictable, and rife with variability. This having been said, we need to stop trying to reengineer the human brain and start building engineering controls that protect workers when they make mistakes or even deliberately take unnecessary risks or behave recklessly. We need to recognize that everyone makes mistakes, whether it be human error or poor choices, nobody should have to die because they chose poorly. I know there are people out there who feel differently (shamefully even some people within the safety practice), people who believe that some people, because of their poor decisions deserve to be injured or killed, but for me, killing workers is still bad business.

Filed under: Behavior Based Safety, culture change, Hazard Management, Mistake proofing, process improvement, Worker Safety, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Discouraging Workers from Reporting Injuries Is Bad Business


By Phil La Duke

Under-reporting injuries is a poor business practice bordering on criminal behavior. Nowhere was this better evidence than when the U.S. government leveed a whopping $70 million fine on Honda of America for doing just that. In what The New York Times describes as a “sharp escalation of penalties against automakers that skirt safety laws” Honda Fined for Violations of Safety Law, Honda was fined for not reporting consumer injuries and deaths caused by quality defects and for not reporting the defects themselves. Last year, General Motors faced similar sanctions.

It’s worth noting that neither company has been accused (at least formally) of underreporting worker injuries, but is that such a stretch? General Motors has consistently reported one of the best safety records in industry and Honda of America hasn’t made OSHA’s radar since 1999 when one of its contractors were fined over $1 million for machine guarding issues.

All that having been said, is it a stretch to believe that companies that deliberately lie to and one branch of the government (the Department of Transportation) about public safety might not also lie to another branch of the government (OSHA) about the safety of its workers? How confidant are you that companies that do not report one set of data (in this case public deaths and defect claims) that is publicly available and can easily be discovered will willingly and openly and accurately report injuries that happen under the shroud of company secrecy? We talk a lot about indicators in this business and to me there is a strong correlation between cooking one set of books and the likelihood that another set of books is equally cooked.

Rumor has it that underreporting is an area of increasing concern among OSHA inspectors and that companies can expect stricter penalties for underreporting.

Underreporting potentially poses a much more serious threat to worker safety than injuries themselves. When a worker is injured it provides the company with irrefutable evidence that safety is not present in the workplace, assuming you define, as most persist in doing, safety as the absence of injuries. As horrible as it is to have workplace injuries the silver lining is that a heretofore-unknown hazard is revealed and can be rectified; not so if the injury goes unreported and unknown.

Companies need not hatch any insidious plot to conceal injuries in most cases thirty years or more of hackneyed incentive programs and half-baked schemes from safety pundits have created a culture where injuries are taboo and only those injuries that cannot be manipulated via case management are reported.

It’s no accident that recordable injuries are falling while fatalities are staying flat (or in some industries actually rising)—it’s tough to turn a corpse into a first aid case no matter how creative you are. Case management has become a crucial part of the safety management system and it should be. No one should be allowed to fraudulently file injury claims in an attempt to cheat the system, but then again, as loathsome as it is, the company has to balance the cost of fighting the cost of fraud against the actual cost of the fraud. This is well known in the insurance and legal communities where it is common practice to settle a dubious lawsuit rather than face a lengthy and costly legal battle. And yet companies still invest considerable sums into case management. Why? Is fraud so widespread that something has to be done or western civilization itself would collapse? No, at least according to studies cited by Lisa Cullen in her article The Myth of Workers’ Compensation Fraud only 1–2% of Worker Compensation claims are fraudulent. So why do so many companies continue to fund Case Management efforts. Is it fiscally responsible to invest money disputing claims when only 2% or less are fraudulent? Not unless disputing claims serves some other, more profitable purpose. In the instance of case management the purpose is clear (although seldom admitted): reducing recordable injuries. I know of cases where companies have sent representatives to the clinic with injured employees to instruct the medical professionals in how to treat an injuries—weighing in on everything from the type of pain reliever used to whether to suture a cut or to close it using butterfly bandages. Such practices smack of questionable ethics but are widespread nonetheless.

Some efforts that discourage injury reporting are less malignant in intent but are just as damaging to the overall efforts to reduce risk. Companies routinely sponsor incentive programs for workers to not get hurt. If that phrasing sounds odd to you it should. When you provide incentive for someone not to do something that they can’t control and aren’t doing on purpose, what message are you sending? When you provide incentive for something beyond one’s control—whether that be injuries or sales—the only true incentive is to cheat and lie. The incentive in the case of zero injury rewards is to underreport.

One can take this effort to discourage reporting injuries even further and pit worker against worker through “behavior observations” which in effect vilify the injured worker; the injured worker spoils the Safety BINGO, and may even cost coworkers their bonuses. The coercive pressure to conceal workplace injuries can be overwhelming.

We talk a lot about changing the culture and about how workers need to change how they view safety, but maybe the cultural change needs to be in who we view injury and injury reporting. If we as organizations and individuals truly value safety we have to stop pretending that condoning injuries provided that they aren’t recordable injuries is the same thing as valuing safety.

Filed under: Behavior Based Safety, Injury reporting, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Insights on Culture

By Phil LaDuke

On Friday I went to the neighborhood bar as I am wont to do from time to time. While there I saw a regular who works with my brother in an open die forge. I passed the pleasantries with him and asked him how he was. He said he was doing a lot better and was healing. I didn’t know what he was talking about so I asked him. He explained that he was burned badly at work; second-degree burns over most of his lower leg. He quickly produced a cellphone and proudly displayed a gruesome photo of a badly burned leg. As I looked at the sickening display he recounted the details. He prefaced his story with a quick, “It was my own fault, I was so (expletive) stupid”, and told his tale of his not paying attention to a hot piece and having his pants catch on fire. Instead of using sand to put out the flames he panicked and ran. There were some jokes made in poor taste about the old Bill Cosby “Stop, Drop, and Roll” television ads, and I asked him how much time he missed. “Not a day. I took it like a man.” Took it like a man; his comment made me think about culture.

Culture is all the rage in safety these days. Circa 1972 James Reason made the observation that before an organization can create a “Just Culture” it must first create a “Safety Culture”. Reason wasn’t talking about worker safety, at least not in the way we tend to think of it. Unfortunately, the snake oil salesmen have glommed onto the term like lampreys on a fish’s soft white underbelly and subvert it more and more each day.

My acquaintance’s story tells us a lot about culture and the relationship between safety and culture. It occurred to me that there are levels within culture and if we are hoping to change the culture of our organizations we need to examine the nuances of culture. Each level of safety culture is characterized by a perception of a reaction of some sort; each one is driven by a fear of some sort.

Fear of Discipline

The other day I was late for a doctor’s appointment and I was tempted to speed; I didn’t. My first thought was, “I don’t need a ticket”. The idea of spending money on a ticket and the time it would take up just didn’t seem to favorably balance against the time I might save. As many times as my doctor made me wait (ultimately I had to wait in the doctor’s office anyway) I figured I was owed some slack. In the moment of decision, I placed more value on compliance than I did on the potential value.

Fear of Loss of Reputation

As I reflected on my decision I thought about culture. What, I asked myself, would I have done if my speeding had been through a school zone. What influence would the opinions of my friends and neighbors have on my decision. I think it would be fair to say that for many the risk of damaging our public image (coupled with the fear of discipline) would put more pressure on me to conform to a norm and to adhere to the values of the community. My desire to preserve my reputation was stronger than my desire to get to the doctor’s on time.

Fear of Culpability

Of course there also was my concern for public safety. I’d like to think that most of us want to behave safely when the lives of innocent school children are at stake. But even when the situation isn’t about endangering school children there is on some level a desire to be a good person and good member of the population; a good citizen, if you will. In our heart of hearts we all want to conform to the shared values of the culture. We go along to get along.

Putting It Into Practice

If these fears are the drivers of culture then what are we to do with this information. Well think back to the guy in the bar who set fire to his leg. Clearly the culture of his company valued guys who “man up” when it comes to injury. Here is a guy who is working while heavily medicated; doped up on pain medication. This is a culture that values a lower DART rate than it does the safety of the remaining employees (how do you think the performance of a heavily medicated employee will be effected?). This is a culture that encourages workers to “man up” and work while injured. This is a culture that doesn’t seem to value worker safety much. I realize this is harsh criticism and that I can’t really make judgments on the company simply because of an account from an injured worker. I think it’s important to note that the worker in question likes his employers and generally has good things to say about his company. The net sum total is this worker’s willingness to go to work rather than to stay home and recuperate he didn’t do it out of fear of repercussions he did it out of fear for his reputation and to conform to the shared values of the population.

The takeaway here is to change your culture you first have to understand the coercive pressures you put on people every day. You need to ask yourself three basic questions:

  • What value does the organization place on discipline? Are people hailed as heroes for “manning up” or dismissed as wimps because they report injuries or seek appropriate medical attention.
  • How are people who value safety viewed? Are they seen as solid professionals
  • How is risk viewed? Are people with a low risk tolerance seen as top performers or as “worry warts”?

The point I’m trying to make is that you may be fostering a culture that actually promotes the things that you are trying to change.


Filed under: Behavior Based Safety, Hazard Management, Just Culture, Safety, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Six Simple Ways to Change Your Life

by Phil La Duke

Years ago I worked in talent development for one of the largest faith-based healthcare systems in the United States. I left it to pursue other career goals but it never left me, at least not completely. The system was founded when two religious orders merged after discovering that the youngest among the two orders was 78 years old. They came together to preserve a way of life that had existed over 500 years. Sure it ran hospitals, but more important was the spiritual community that it had created. Faced with extinction it set about an elaborate plan for turning over its legacy to the laity. I always took that very seriously. For me it wasn’t about organizational development or training, although these were certainly a big part of my job, rather it was about preserving a way of life.
Some time ago I shared the podium at the Canadian Society of Safety Engineers with an anthropologist and National Geographic photographer who talked about cultural extinction (which interestingly enough, he attributed to the growth of the written word). According to him, cultures are going extinct at a far faster rate than animals; it’s scary really, thousands of years of knowledge lost as cultures die daily. I was determined that I would do everything in my power to save this one culture to which I had been entrusted.
I wasn’t the only one so entrusted; there were scores of professionals whose primary jobs were to preserve the mission, culture, and vision of the consolidated order. One of the tools they had for preserving the culture was the Guiding Behaviors (note to the grammar vigilantes: I know this sounds like number disagreement but the Guiding Behaviors is considered one tool). As I reflected this morning, as I do every morning, on these behaviors it occurred to me that these would serve the safety professionals as much as anyone else. I have changed the wording of some of these to make them less specific to healthcare, but I doubt the surviving members of the orders will mind too much.

“We support each other in service”
The first of the behaviors is “we support each other in service” what better way for a safety professional to sum up his or her job? We don’t really save lives—not the way doctors or nurses do anyway—but we can always support people in making better decisions and while not directly saving lives influencing people to save their own lives or the lives of a coworker.

“We communicate openly and honestly, respectfully, and directly”
I’ve written volumes about the importance of open and honest communication. I still believe that the only path for safety professionals to get respect is by truly respecting the people and organizations they serve. It’s disappointing how many safety professionals disparage the people they are charged with protecting. People who feel respected tend to respond respectfully. We must always strive, not only to be truthful, but truly honest and not just with the people we serve but with ourselves as well. And let us never confuse hurtful speech with honesty. Before speaking we should ask ourselves, “is what I want to say true? Is it helpful? Is it intended to help someone or merely to make ourselves feel better? And finally, is it necessary?” if all of these things aren’t true then maybe we should just keep it to ourselves.

“We are fully present”
Perhaps the behavior I struggle with the most is “we are fully present”. Being fully present means that you keep your mind on the job—no multitasking, no distractions, no dreaming about the weekend. While it’s easy to see how staying fully present on the job would greatly benefit most workers—distraction on the job can be deadly—we also need to be fully present as safety professionals. This means really participating in meetings and really listening (not just waiting to talk) and working with others to accomplish things. Keeping your head in the game every minute of every day is really tough and if you try to do it you will come home exhausted.
“We are all accountable”
“We are all accountable” means more than holding others accountable, although that is certainly a part of it. We also must strive to hold ourselves accountable. Each day we must ask ourselves if we earned our pay. Did we make a positive impact in people’s lives, not just in the context of safety, but did we make the workplace (and the world) a more pleasant place? Did we really bring our “A” game or did we merely phone it in? We must also remember that we have a duty to be just in holding others accountable. We do not stand in judgment above those we serve, but we owe it to the organization and to the entire population to hold people answerable—both positively and negatively,
“We trust and assume goodness in intentions”
People screw with our work, our day, and our heads on a daily basis. But trusting and assuming goodness in intentions has taught me one of the most powerful lessons of my life: we screw with our own work, our own day, and our own heads far more often than anyone else ever could. They say that forgiveness is a gift we give ourselves and it begins by never taking slight in the first place. Instead of assuming that the Operations leadership is throwing us under the bus we should ask the person some questions. Most often we will find that because we assume that the person meant us no harm and was probably completely unaware of the issues he or she was creating for us. Assuming goodness in intentions brings a person real peace and strengthens relationships. There is a saying that if you keep meeting jerks all day long the jerk is you. I say that if you assume goodness of intention in all you meet you will live in a world like you could never imagine. Send out good stimuli and you receive good responses.
“We are continuous learners”
Too often we strive to teach. We are, after all, the experts in safety and what good is that expertise unless we share it with the organization? We get sad and frustrated when people don’t want to listen to what we have to say. But when we are continuous learners, when we focus not on what we can teach others, but what we can learn from them, we find that we end up teaching other so much more of value than if we were to just spout facts at them. Continuous learning involves a lot of introspection—we have to examine our mistakes and try hard to understand why things went wrong and what we can do to fix things them.
The World Loves a Hypocrite
While I try to live by these simple six statements I don’t always succeed; in fact I fail a lot. But the beauty of these guiding behaviors is that they are things to which I aspire. So now I charge you to share these aspirations with me. Try doing these six things for a week. You may fail, but remember in some cases success comes, not in the outcome, but in the attempt.

Filed under: Behavior Based Safety, Hazard Management, Just Culture, Performance Improvement, Phil La Duke, Worker Safety, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The Swindle Continues

snake-oil (1)

By Phil La Duke

Last week I made my eighth speech at the National Safety Council’s Annual Congress and Expo. In consideration of my speaking at the event I am given a full conference admission, which affords me access to the exhibit hall and sessions.  I usually help cover the show for Facility Safety Management by posting a story or two; this involves me attending technical sessions that I might ordinarily avoid like a diuretic rat.  This year was no exception and no surprise.  What WAS surprising however, is the shear volume of snake oil salesmen who have seemingly dropped the Behavior Based Safety in favor of “Transformational Safety”.

All the familiar faces were there each spouting “it’s all about culture” and “it’s about leadership commitment” where once they hailed behavior as the single largest cause of injuries.   They’re right of course, the key to safety does lie in culture change, but do any of these companies that until now shouted down anyone who dared question there sacred belief of behavior as the holy grail of safety and behavior modification as the magic bullet that would magically deliver companies from the injury bogey man?

Before we get into this troubling development, let’s set a couple of things straight.  Behavior is in fact the largest cause of injuries.  People make human errors, take chances (informed and uninformed) that result injuries, people are careless, reckless and make poor choices.  That has never been in dispute.  In fact, if you trace any injury back far enough you will absolutely find some behavioral cause.  No, what I (and others far smarter than I) have always criticized about BBS is the junk science and misapplied psychology that concluded that it would be easy and would provide a quick fix.  Manipulating an entire population such that it no longer makes human errors, takes chances (informed and uninformed) that result injuries, and behave carelessly, recklessly and stop making poor choices is patently absurd.

Now so many of the old BBS providers are suddenly abandoning their old party line and pushing culture change, or transformations.

As for “management commitment” being the key to a safe workplace well that falls into the “so obvious as to be insulting”.  What corporate initiative has any chance of success if management—at any level—doesn’t support it.  The concept that management can remain on the sideline and the change will somehow take hold is so stupid that it doesn’t bear mentioning.  Except the sessions that I attended the speakers mentioned management commitment in the same hushed whispers and reverential tones that they once reserved for BBS.

Culture Transformation approaches to safety are sound and effective approaches to increasing the overall effectiveness of an organization—not just in safety, but in quality, delivery, material control, productivity, environmental, and management systems.  In fact, Lean Manufacturing, World-Class Management, Six Sigma, Kaisen, are all culture transformations to one extent or another.  But the question is this: can the people who were selling snake oil a year ago be trusted to know anything about culture transformations? I don’t think so, and neither should you.

The question is not whether the culture needs to change, rather, do the people who until recently were hawking BBS snake oil qualified to deliver a viable methodology for achieving a sustainable culture change?

For my part I am deeply skeptical of the snake oil salesmen’s newfound religion.  I believe that this is just a shell game; that the methodologies currently being hawked by the neo-culturalists is simply a rebranding of the same old crap. (I attended one session on culture where the speaker said so many incorrect things about culture, the origins of the concept of “safety culture”[1] that I walked out in less than five minutes; that was all I could stand.  I don’t blame these companies for trying to survive and spokespeople from both the National Safety Council and American Society of Safety Engineers told me (after I asked them what type of presentation abstracts they wanted to see) “any thing but BBS—people are sick of it.  Now if you’re livelihood was threatened how would you respond? Might you not be tempted to rebrand your products to fit what the buyers want?  Of course it would be far more ethical to actually LEARN about the new methodology instead of just slapping a new label on the same old schlocky crap, but different strokes for different folks. These people are playing with people’s lives, limbs, and livelihoods—it’s a disgraceful place to experiment.

I’ve confronted the safety sentimentalists—openly scoffing at their sanctimonious “I save lives” and their sophomoric  “we love you go home safe” sentimentality—so at the risk of sounding like one of the very people I have so often condemned as making all us safety professionals look like simpering goofballs I so often attack, let me ask you this, don’t we have a higher calling? We aren’t selling candy bars, we aren’t trading sock, or doing tours, or performing any service that —while important and valuable—have such important consequences.  We have a responsibility to confront the snake oil salesmen who talk a good game but at the end of the day produce nothing lasting, nothing of meaningful value.

There are good providers of culture change interventions and maybe even some of the people who spoke at the congress, but it can be difficult for executives to know the difference between the snake oil salesmen and the providers of sound transformational services. I certainly am not in a position to tar all of these people as liars, cheats and thieves, but if we don’t expose the frauds in our field who will?  We need a healthy dose of skepticism when dealing with this herd of crap-merchants rushing tired retreads to market. We need to do something and do it quick. As long as we continue to let charlatans sell us crap we put people at risk, and putting people at risk is the very opposite of our jobs, and our vocations and should not be the legacy that we leave.

[1] James Reason coined the term in  1990.

Filed under: Behavior Based Safety, Just Culture, Safety, , ,

If You Want to Change the Culture Focus on “Must Do” Behaviors Not “Don’t Do” Behaviors


By Phil La Duke

Perhaps the best thing about working in Organizational Development is that I don’t hang around any one industry for protracted periods of time; I basically am called into solve a problem, that, once solved, eliminates the need for my services. (It plays hell with repeat business, but then I don’t hang around like some smarmy parasite that convinces the client of needs that are questionable at one end of the spectrum and out-and-out fraud at the other end.) Not that I don’t enjoy repeat business where there is truly a need, but moving from organization to organization working on unique problems that provide me with deep insights in to the nature of safety and often great ideas that I can apply in other industries and in other ways. In a way, it’s like getting paid to benchmark. Often I learn things of which the companies are so proud they would love to share their ideas with the entire world. In other cases I learn from the mistakes that companies make. I can than, after carefully considering what I would do differently were I to make those decisions. In short, my trans industrial knowledge and experience is part and parcel why companies hire and pay me for my services.
Perhaps the most valuable experience I’ve gained is relative to behavior vis-à-vis injuries. I’ve all but given up trying to sway people away from traditional Behavior-Based-Safety (BBS). In some cases arguing with a BBS fanatic is like doing card tricks for a dog: no matter how slowly and carefully you explain it or how many times you do it they just don’t get it. In other cases, it’s like arguing with the person who is trying get you to eat fricasseed squirrel anus. First you say, “no thank you. I’ve tried fricasseed squirrel anus and I don’t care for it” but they insist, arguing that the fricasseed squirrel anus you had wasn’t properly cooked, or that you really don’t understand what fricasseed squirrel anus is, or you haven’t had it cooked the way THEY cook it: It’s not even made with squirrel, there is no anus in it, and in fact it’s baked!!!” In either case, it just gets tiresome and I don’t think it’s worth the time and aggravation arguing logic with someone who is emotional about an issue.
So while this won’t be one of my notorious anti-BBS rants, I have learned a lot about behaviors and how they are viewed within organizations.
The most successful organizations don’t focus on UNSAFE behaviors, rather they focus on guiding behaviors—those expectations of behavior that govern the way people interact, and these behaviors are a) positive and b) transcend any one industry. In broad strokes, the most successful (and by that I mean those organizations with a demonstrable commitment to worker safety; I’ve found that the companies who legitimately care about worker safety also tend to be the most successful according to other criteria for success (financial, sustainability, etc.).
• We Respect Each Other. A functional and successful organization insists that everyone respects one another; this is difficult to fake although far too many organizations try. Dr. Paul Marciano is one of the foremost experts on worker engagement and he would be the first to tell you that an engaged workforce is one where workers are respected have no doubt of it. I’m puzzled by the difficulty supervisors and managers struggle with genuinely respecting the workers. In general the workforce is no less intelligent, less sophisticated, or in anyway inferior to those with “titled” positions, but to hear some supervisors and managers (the lack of the use of the word “leader” is deliberate) tell it you would quickly surmise that they seem to believe that the people who work for them are little more than sub-simian drones without the proverbial sense God gave geese. Workers want the same thing management wants, to make a living with as little hassle as possible. This desire for an easy go of it—occupationally speaking—isn’t borne out of laziness, rather, it’s origins lie in the simple practicality, that comes from spending the bulk of our waking hours in the workplace. It makes sense that people would want as peaceful and stress-free, and dare I say, safe environment as possible. Treating people with respect—as equals that have the same value to the organization’s success as we do—is the cornerstone of a robust culture that values safety.
• We Believe That there is No Job Is Worth Dying For. When people do things that place them in the greatest jeopardy it’s often in the misguided attempt to be a hero. People sometimes do very dangerous things to try to keep the operations running; they don’t do it for the screaming adulations of the organization’s leaders; they do it to contribute to the company’s success, to be a part of the common good, to help preserve everyone’s livelihood. Okay, maybe it’s not so “God and Country” but in a good many cases people get hurt trying to save time, not just “butt time” but an earnest attempt to help out. And it’s not always the individual’s fault, a lot of times the organization rewards dangerous behavior as “can do attitude” and those who take unreasonable risks as “guys who can get things done”. Organization’s that truly value safety don’t see people who put themselves in the line of fire as heroes. Successful companies realize that there’s nothing heroic in keeping the plant, mill, mine, or depot running. Successful companies value the health and safety of it’s workers above production.
• We Trust People’s Intentions. When someone gets hurt doing something that could have been easily predicted and avoided, it’s tempting to see them as being lazy, stupid, careless, reckless, or otherwise up to no good. While that is certainly a probability, it’s seldom a probability. There is something of a defense mechanism in our belief that faced with a similar choice we would somehow be smarter, wiser, and more rational. Ascribing less than laudable motivations to people who get hurt is common. Too often people investigate incidents filled with preconceived notions about the motivations of the injured. But organizations that demand that people trust in the good intentions of each other seek first to understand and never rush to judgment.
• We Take Pride in The Jobs We Do. High-functioning organizations expect everyone to do their jobs correctly because it’s the right thing to do. These organizations take pains to recruit and retain people who are intrinsically motivated to do their jobs most efficiently and that understand that safety and efficiently are one and the same. These organizations believe that there is always time to do the job right, not just at the individual level but at the organizational level.
• We Communicate Openly and Honestly. Organizations with the best safety performance aren’t afraid to confront unsafe conditions and behaviors; on the contrary they expect everyone in the organization to do so. Confronting unsafe conditions means suspending judgment and assertively calling people out; its not about blame, it’s about accountability and honesty. It’s about more than owning hazards, it’s also about standing up and speaking up; it’s about doing the right thing.
• We support each other in service. A behavior that many organizations try to foment but few succeed in doing so is the “brother’s keeper” mentality. Truly successful companies take this one step further and expect all members of the organization to support each other in service. This means that workers at all levels genuinely seek to help their fellow workers to succeed, not just in the safe execution of their jobs, but in all aspects of success. This behavior is about more than keeping each other safe, it’s about providing a level of support so profound that the success of one’s co-worker is as least as important as one’s own success, and in some cases—depending on the context—it’s far more important.
In effect, identifying behaviors that are undesirable, unsafe and inappropriate can only tell workers when they have disappointed you; it’s reactive and punitive. But a code of behavior, a list of institutional expectations, a communication of the ideals of an organization manifested in an expression of the expected norms of behaviors leads the entire organization to an aspiration of a better workplace. In the final estimation the most successful companies worry less about what they accomplish and more about the means by which they accomplish it. These organizations value how people behave as much if not more than the end result.

Filed under: Behavior Based Safety, Safety, , , ,

What Would Doris Do?



By Phil La Duke

Hazard analysis is key to appropriately protecting workers from dangers in the workplace, but too often we do a mediocre job.  Protecting workers from the hazards they are likely to encounter can’t be a half measure and most workplaces would benefit from better and more accurate hazard analysis and risk management. Like Goldilocks, Hazard Analysis needs to be just right—not overly protective, but also not overly reliant on common sense, probability, or good luck.

Addressing Behaviors

People conducting Hazard Analysis often tend to focus too greatly on the physical hazards endemic to so many workplaces; it makes sense, physical hazards are easy to spot and the hazards associated with them are easy to predict.  Unfortunately it is the hazards most likely to result in serious injury—or fatalities—in the greatest source of variation: human behavior.  This is the point where I typically launch into one of my tiresome rants about the evils about Behavior Based Safety, but not today. The reality is that hazard analysis must consider human behavior because it is so unpredictable and potentially lethal.

Human Error

Studies have shown that the average person makes between five and eight errors an hour.  (Suck on that all you armchair editors!) Most of these mistakes are benign that have no real consequences.  Human errors seem to be our sub consciousness mind experimenting with the safety of our surroundings; a means of testing the safety of rapid adaptation. Sometimes the result is serendipitous discovery and in other cases the result is injury.  Many people who conduct hazard analysis create work plans and Job Safety Analysis (JSAs) plan for a perfect world. Even though we know for certain that people will make mistakes and there is nothing shy of rewiring the human brain that can do to prevent mistakes, but we can prevent people from being harmed from these mistakes if we accurately predict the mistakes we can generally implement countermeasures to prevent the associated injuries.

Risky Business

Risk is part of life and created a hazard analysis that doesn’t predict and address the very likely probability that people will take risks—from shortcuts to bad habits—isn’t worth very much, at least in terms of protecting workers. Hazard analysis should clearly identify the areas where workers are most likely going to take risks.  In terms of risks, the likelihood of risk-taking, and the level of risk taking is directly proportionate to the risk-to-reward ratio.  The greater the disparity between the perceived rewards to the probability of failure the more likely one is to take the risk.


Whenever I talk about the need for a comprehensive hazard analysis invariably I get people pushing back in the name of common sense.  “Can’t we give people for a little ‘common sense’?”  The answer is “no” because there is very little common sense in the world.  Common sense is the product of a shared understanding of a situation by members of a population.  As anyone who is from a small town can attest to, common sense decreases as the population size increases.  In a small population, it’s easy to create solid mores, values, and taboos—these all grow out of decades of shared experience, the fabled “tribal knowledge” that corporate big wigs are always so desperate to capture.  Unfortunately, as the population grows common sense/common knowledge shrinks inversely.  So when people ask if they can count on people having “common sense” they are effectively counting on luck to protect people.

What Would Doris Do?

People can be damned stupid and reckless and the “perfect world” hazard analysis seldom captures the outlandish and reckless risks that an admittedly small portion of the population, may take on the job site.  Unless we acknowledge that there is a chance, albeit a small chance, that workers will take outrageous and reckless chances we can’t adequately protect workers from this recklessness.

Recently I encountered a situation that exemplifies this tendency for some workers to take outrageous risks.  I was outside a car rental office a couple of weeks ago when a United States Postal Service truck turned right onto a side walk and proceeded to drive approximately 40 feet down a public sidewalk.  When I confronted her by asking, “did you really just drive down the sidewalk?” she snarled in defiance, “yes!”. “Don’t you have any regard for safety?” I asked and the only response I got from her was a hissing sound that sounded like something between a viper and air escaping a punctured tire.  Finally I asked her if what she did was legal, to which she smirked and said “yes” in the tone of voice of a petulant child.  I phoned the local postal office and reported her behavior and was asked if the door was open (it was) and if she was wearing seatbelts (she wasn’t).  The person to whom I spoke told me that this woman had been recently disciplined for driving with the door of her vehicle open and for not wearing seat belts.

For those of you who don’t know, the USPS workers (at least those who drive company vehicles) jobs rely on the workers having a valid driver’s license and a good driving record.  I’ve dubbed this woman Doris (although I have no way of knowing her real name) and I have adapted the popular, “What would Jesus Do?” slogan to hazard analysis.  I encourage people to ask “What Would Doris Do?” when conducting hazard analysis.  By asking what this addle-headed woman would do in a given work situation those who are conducting hazard analysis can understand that sometimes reasonableness and appropriate, rational responses to a situation.

If we continue to pretend that the workplace is perfect and the workers will not make mistakes, take risks, and behave as if they are whacked out of their heads on LSD we can never truly anticipate hazards in any sort of realistic context.  When we recognize that we live—and more importantly work—in an imperfect world we can finally make appropriate decisions with respect to safety.

Filed under: Behavior Based Safety, Hazard Management, , ,

Working In the Line of Fire


By Phil La Duke

When someone dies in the workforce through no fault of his or her own it’s undeniably a tragedy.  But in many people’s minds, line of fire injuries—those injuries that result when a worker places his or her body in the direct path of  a serious hazard—the injured worker must bear at least some culpability for his or her injury. It’s especially easy to dismiss a line of fire injury as the worker’s “own damned fault”, but is it?

Before I continue I should disclose something about myself that could bias me on this topic: my grandfather died on the job from a line of fire injury.  In the case of my grandfather, he was driving a tractor (he was a farmer in the 1950’s having left a lucrative career installing conveyor belts—a job that required extensive travel—so that he could spend more time at home with his family.  He was struck by a speeding locomotive (witnesses said the train was going upward of 80 mph) at a poorly marked crossing.  His view was at least partially obscured by overgrown bushes near the tracks and he was either legally deaf or close to it.  He left behind a widow and four daughters (one of whom was developmentally disabled) who would eke out a hardscrabble living, financially and emotionally crippled by his death; a family laid waste by a single moment.

While there were many things that factored into my grandfather’s untimely demise, the fact remains that in the last moments of his life he made a decision to place himself in the line of fire.  My grandfather isn’t alone; the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that 17% of workplace fatalities (in the U.S.) are the result of line-of-fire injuries.

As you might expect, I spent a lot of time thinking about the circumstances of my grandfather’s death, I don’t attribute it to shaping my view of worker safety, but I suppose that’s inevitable.  Sufficed to say line-of-fire injuries raise a lot of questions; questions, sadly, to which we will most likely never get satisfactory answers.

What were they thinking?

I have always believed in two simple truths about worker injuries: 1) nobody wants to get hurt and 2) the process isn’t designed to hurt them. If these things really are true then why would anybody ever knowingly put themselves in the line of fire? Simple:

  • They don’t believe they are placing themselves in real danger.  No one in his or her right mind (let’s face it: the primary role of our central nervous system is to keep us alive, and as long as that is functioning properly we generally aren’t looking to kill ourselves) expects to be killed when they place themselves in the line of fire. Too often workers who place themselves in the line of fire are making a decision based on imperfect information—they either assume that something is true when it is not, or they assume something is not true when it is.  Take the case of my grandfather, we can only speculate, of course, but for the sake of argument let’s say that he knowingly and deliberately put himself in the line of fire and crossed the railroad tracks without looking or stopping long enough.  Since there is no evidence that he was suicidal—by all accounts he was good-natured, popular, and happy in life—we can infer that he didn’t deliberately place himself in the line of fire thinking that he would most likely be killed—we can speculate that he believed that the likelihood that a train would approach unseen, in fact, undetected were infinitesimally small.  Had he believed that there was a strong possibility that a train would strike him he never would have taken the chance.
  • They believe the time of exposure is small enough to protect them.  How many line of fire injuries are the result of  “I’m only going to be in there for a second” thinking? It’s a big temptation to risk it when you believe that your probability of injury is directly proportionate to the length of exposure to the hazard.  Unfortunately, probability doesn’t work that way and too few workers truly comprehend the dangers that some line of fire hazards pose irrespective of the length of exposure. If a worker makes contact with a piece of energized equipment of sufficient power he or she will be electrocuted even if he or she touches the equipment just for a second.
  • Familiarity breeds content. For most of us, the longer we work around a hazard (or in this case the more we place ourselves in the line of fire) and suffer no negative consequences the less we respect a hazard’s ability to harm us.  We teach ourselves that an activity is safer than it is; as we become more comfortable working around a hazard we convince ourselves that we will not get hurt “as long as we’re careful” when in fact, we are not.
  • The job is too difficult to get done without placing workers in the line of fire. Much as we would love to place the blame squarely on the shoulders of the injured worker, some jobs are so poorly designed or safety procedures are so onerous that no reasonable worker will work within process.  In fact, I know of many companies that continue to have standard operating procedures that place the workers in the line of fire.  These cases are the most troubling because in general workers believe that if they follow the standard operating procedures they will not be injured, even though some processes are grossly unprotected.
  • They aren’t thinking. Research has shown that the average worker makes 8 mistakes an hour (this number falls to around 5 for workers in “high consequence industries—healthcare, aviation, oil & gas, energy, etc.). These are human errors; unintended foul-ups.  Five mistakes an hour, eight hours a shift, five shifts a week amounts to mistakes in the neighborhood of 10,400 mistakes in the course of a work year. Obviously this number is much higher for workers who work longer shifts, six- or seven-day workweeks or any number of a host of other factors that would extend the worker’s work year from the traditional 2,080 hours in a typical year.  Inevitably, some of these mistakes will place the worker in the line of fire.
    The incidence of human error increases when a person is sleep deprived, under stress, using drugs or alcohol or is otherwise preoccupied.  Something as simple as bright lights can dramatically increase a person’s tendency to take risks.

Line of fire injuries may always remain an enigma and as one safety veteran once told me (after learning of the death of veteran worker caused by several line of fire violations). “I don’t know how to save worker’s from themselves.”  I don’t know either, and in truth nobody really does.  We try engineering controls and people remove guards and by-pass interlocks. We put administrative controls in place and workers ignore them, and we require PPE only to have worker’s grouse about wearing it. But one thing is certain, if workers continue to put themselves into the line of fire they will continue dying on the job.

Filed under: Behavior Based Safety, line of fire, ,

The Folly Of Safety Reminders


Don't forget

by Phil La Duke

It’s been awhile since I blogged about the role of behavior in worker safety.  Truth be told, despite the tonnage of digital ink I have devoted to criticizing Behavior Based Safety, I am a firm believer in an organization’s need to address worker behaviors that cause injuries, but I differ with many BBS devotees on the best way to do so.

Variation in human behavior represents the biggest challenge to maintaining a robust and reliable process; whether you are seeking to prevent quality defects, reduce cost, or eliminate injuries you have to consider the effects of human behavior on your process.  That having been said, if we are going to address behavioral causes of Injuries, shouldn’t we concentrate on behaviors we can do something about?

Human Error

Human error is as much a part of being human as anything else; it’s practically encoded in our DNA.  Researchers estimate that the average person makes five mistakes an hour.[1] There seems to be a biological imperative that compels us to make mistakes.  Some believe that mistakes are our subconscious’ way of testing the safety of rapidly adapting to our surroundings.  Irrespective of why we make mistakes, it’s certain that people will make mistakes no matter how hard we try.  Not that we should give up.  While we can’t completely eradicate mistakes we can reduce the probability that human error will result in serious injury or death. Mistake-proofing equipment and processes is an integral part of any safety management process.  We should think of mistake proofing as making our process more forgiving, more tolerant of mistakes.

Of course, we can’t bubble-wrap the world, and any control has limits.  We may not be able to prevent mistakes or protect people from their mistakes, but we can work on ensuring that factors that make mistakes more common are controlled.  There are many things that can make mistakes more likely—from fatigue, drug- or alcohol abuse, to lack of training or stress.  Organizations should redouble their efforts to help workers to manage the things in life that make mistakes more common and potentially, more deadly.

Flawed Decision Making

While human error is inevitable, flawed decision-making need not be.  Workers often make decisions that result in injurious consequences.  Organizations wishing to reduce behavior-related injuries should seriously consider training workers in decision analysis and decision making techniques.

Not all bad decisions are the product of a lack of decision making skills, however, and if an organization discovers a pattern of poor decision making it should take a hard, diagnostic look at its communication.  Often decisions that end in injury are poorly made because someone believed something was true when it wasn’t or didn’t believe it was true when it was.  A lack of communication, or poor communication channels can seriously disrupt the decision making process.

Risk Taking

Every action carries some element of risk with it.  Risk is neither good nor bad, and often we are called on to take risks as part of our daily jobs.  The key is not to have workers become risk averse, instead, we should develop the skills so that workers can take educated, controlled, and planned risks.  When teaching workers how to manage the risks they take, it’s important that organizations train the workers in core skills. Unless workers understand the limits endemic to their processes the risks they take will be more gambles than controlled and planned risk.  While you can coach workers on the inappropriateness of the risks they have taken, it’s far better to educate workers before they are faced with the decision than reactively.


Sometimes workers are so derelict in their duties that we describe their behavior as carelessness.  While some argue that carelessness doesn’t truly exist—that the behavior is really poorly managed performance impediments or recklessness—there are times when a worker is so distracted, manages his or her performance impeding factors, or simply cares so little about the quality of his or her performance that one could accurately characterize the behavior as carelessness.  Carelessness is likely a disciplinary issue; it is unlikely that training, coaching, or mistake proofing will have any meaningful effect.


Sometimes workers will—out of frustration, belligerence, or maliciousness—act in a way so fraught with danger that it can only be categorized as recklessness.  Recklessness is not the act of a mature, responsible professional and it should be addressed surely and immediately.  If the reckless behavior continues the worker should be fired; as drastic as that sounds it may be the only way to protect the organization from the extreme dangers associated with reckless behavior.

Incenting Safe Behaviors

What all these behaviors share is that there is little use in trying to use antiquated behavior modification techniques to change the behaviors.  Traditional incentive and awards is not likely to change subconscious behavior, and attempts to do so can be costly and destructive.  In fact, there is very little we can do externally to change behaviors that aren’t deliberate or that are the product of poor decision making or inappropriate risk taking.


Just because behavior modification and incentives are of limited value and effectiveness doesn’t mean that we can’t do anything to reduce the variability in human behavior that causes injuries.  The first and most important step is observations.  There is a pervasive belief that the only effective way to do safety observations is peer-to-peer; I don’t believe this, but I will leave those criticisms for another day.  We can’t address unsafe behaviors unless we know when and why they occur.  A safety observation can be as simple as a supervisor walking his or her work area talking to workers and watching them as they worker work.  Supervisors can coach workers on managing performance impediments, risk taking, and decision making while being alert for carelessness or recklessness.



[1] I’ve cited this research many times.  I saw a speaker on patient safety at a medical conference.  I took detailed notes as to the research that concluded this, but sadly lost it in a flood (along with many other irreplaceables).  If anyone knows the study, the researcher, or a parallel source of the findings I would sure appreciate hearing from them.

Filed under: Behavior Based Safety, Hazard Management, Just Culture, Mistake proofing, Phil La Duke, Safety, Safety Culture, , , , , , , , , , ,

The Rise of The Safety Extremist

By Phil La Duke

 Stop extremsim

“’Isms’ in my opinion are not good”
—Ferris Bueller, Ferris Bueller’s Day Off 

fa·nat·ic (fuh-nat-ik) noun

  1. a person with an extreme and uncritical enthusiasm or zeal, as in religion or politics.

ex·trem·ist (ik-stree-mist) noun

  1. a person who goes to extremes, especially in political matters.
  2. a supporter or advocate of extreme doctrines or practices.

I write provocative material.  I deliberately try to elicit a visceral response and take people to a place where they can explore their deepest held beliefs and question basic ideologies of safety. The latest in neuroscience suggests that our decisions or made and our ability to change reside deep in our subconscious beneath our defenses. When something strikes a nerve at that level it can be difficult to  have a rational conversation, but in general, if one can at least reconsider one’s belief set maybe its worth it.

Why is it important to reexamine our deepest held beliefs? Because the world is a dynamic place and if our beliefs are static we become increasingly out of touch.  If we cling blindly to our beliefs and lash out to anyone who threatens our worldview then we run the risk of becoming completely and dangerously out of touch with the realities of your profession and become a useless relic.  That should be career suicide, but sadly even the most out of touch hacks can usually find work based on their years and years of experience.  But what good is 40.2 years of experience if that experience consists chiefly of self-congratulatory affirmations and retreads of theories that are a century old.

Not that every new idea is a good one.  There is as much crap spewed by the idea d’jour pundits today as there ever has been. And just because an idea or theory is new doesn’t make it any better than conventional wisdom, but it’s important that any professional consider new ideas and emerging thought with an open mind.

That’s getting tougher and tougher to do in safety, owing to the rise in extremist thought in safety. The merest suggestion that we discard a safety truism is likely to to create nothing short of a public out rage.  Take for instance the response to Heinrich’s Pyramid.  A recent thread on the social networking site LinkedIn elicited 3,186 comments ranging from the intellectually bantering to the crackpot personal attacks. The thread quoted a recent assertion by EHS Today:

“Heinrich’s assertion that 88% of accidents are the result of unsafe acts has been dismissed as something he just made up. There was no research behind it whatsoever. “ and asked the simple question “What’s your opinion? And why?”

According to a recent article by Ashley Johnson in H+S Magazine a poll the magazine conducted found that 86% of respondents believed either completely or somewhat in Heinrich’s theories, while another 10% reporting that they weren’t familiar with Heinrich’s theories.  The article is a scathing indictment of Heinrich’s theories from experts who question his methods, his conclusions, and generally speaking nearly everything had to say.  The article was balanced by a half-hearted defense that the numbers were never meant to be statistical predictors (the were, by the way) and that Heinrich never blamed the workers (he did. In fact Heinrich was a devotee of eugenics and believed that one’s race and ethnicity played a factor in the likelihood that a worker would be injured or cause an injury to other.)

The What does this all have to do with extremism? Plenty.  This demonstrates that  despite a growing body of evidence that deeply held belief will hold sway.  This in itself is not extremism, but it does create an environment where extremists thrive.  Why do people cling to beliefs that are refuted (there are still people who deeply believe in fake photos and film footage of the Loch Ness Monster and Big Foot, even though the perpetrators of these hoaxes[1])? People tend to want to believe in what they’re doing and when people chip away at the foundation.

Its not just the Heinrich supporters who will lash out against any suggestion that doesn’t support their world view.  If you don’t believe me just publish something critical about Behavior Based Safety.  Within hours extremists and fanatics will marshal their forces and begin attacking you.  The problem has grown to such an extent that several editors of leading safety magazines actively avoid the debate more out of a desire to avoid arguing with fanatics than out of fear or intimidation.  But intimidation of the press is a goal of extremists everywhere —from Al Quida to the Ku Klux Klan to the Neo Nazis to the safety extremists—is to discredit, attack, intimidate, and generally silence the media which, if it is truly unbiased—will never buy there bill of goods.

Extremism Is Rooted In Fear

Let’s suppose you have 40.2 years of experience in safety where you served with distinction, and someone comes along and asserts something contrary to the foundation on which your entire experience is predicated.  What happens to your credentials and accomplishments and very identity as a safety professional when all on which it is built crumbles? People will protect their beliefs with a wildness typically reserved for mother grizzlies defending their cubs; they will make ugly personal attacks and seek to gather together like-minded souls close to them.

Extremism Loves Company

Social networking sites make it easy to reach out to a world of people. Some credit social networking with ushering in Arab Spring, but it also has a darker side.  Social Networking affords us the opportunity for the fanatics to get their ideas out to a sympathetic ear. Unfortunately, when it comes to safety, people are dying in the workplace while crackpots are postulating theories that are given equal weight with responsible theorists in safety.  I will leave the readers to decide which slide of the equation on which I fall.

[1] I’m speaking of the most famous loch ness monster photo and the actual film footage of a reputed big foot. The very people who first produced them convincingly disproved both of these.  If you want to believe in the Loch Ness monster or Big Foot God bless you, but what was the most compelling evidence has been disproven. And don’t even get me started on crop circles.

Filed under: Behavior Based Safety, Phil La Duke, Safety, Safety Culture, Worker Safety, , , , , ,



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