Safe As We Want To Be

great-white-shark-wallpaper---1280x960

By Phil La Duke

Some weeks ago I was in Huntington Beach California, a four-hour plane ride from my home of Detroit.  I was in Los Angeles for business and took some time to relax.  Whenever I get the chance to do so, I surf.  I am, I admit, the world’s worst surfer but as it is an individual (as opposed to a team) endeavor I reason that my poor surfing skills are no one’s problem but my own. As it happened, the beach had been closed the previous weekend as a result of one surfer’s encounter with a particularly aggressive Great White shark.  The surfer wasn’t harmed (nor was the shark for that matter) but as a matter of precaution the beach was closed.

The days that I were there the beach was crowded, it being a hot and sunny day, but there were no surfers and scant few swimmers.  Those who did choose to go into the water chose to stay in water that was knee-deep at best.  I paddled out.

For some, surfing in shark-infested waters may seem foolhardy, even reckless.  But for me the fact that I so seldom get an opportunity to surf far out weighed the incredibly remote chance that I would encounter a shark let alone be attacked by one.

Was my behavior at risk? To be sure, it was.  But was it reckless? Or even unsafe? Well…I don’t believe so.  Recently I read a book about workplace safety.  Like most of the self-published dreck that is churned out in the name of safety it was obvious the author had never worked in an industrial setting.  The author (and I am deliberately withholding the title and author, not because I fear reprisals like lawsuits or customers deserting me, but because I honestly think much of the book is dangerously stupid advice that would do more harm than good and I don’t want to promote it) cites “thrill seeking” as a principle contributor to unsafe workplaces.  Of course the author has no research to back up his position and most of the book is seemingly based on one man’s opinion (and if that is what the author intended he should have written a serious of blog articles instead of a book, but that’s neither here nor there.)

Identifying thrill seeking as a causative factor in worker injuries is, in my opinion, simply another way of blaming the injured party for getting hurt.  As Dr. Robert Long says, “Risk makes sense” (numerous times in his book of the same name, which I do recommend, not because I agree with it (I do, but that is beside the point) but because it cites reams of research that supports his positions.)

While it makes a great story, surfing with the sharks, wasn’t thrill seeking.  If I believed that I was in serious jeopardy of a shark attack I wouldn’t have paddled out.  In fact, the local authorities publicly stated that they didn’t believe there was an elevated risk, but warned that surfers and swimmers should be more watchful for sharks and if one should make an appearance cut it a wide berth.  So I reasoned (correctly it would seem) that I was not in any more danger than I normally would be (primarily from sports injuries or drowning).  My behavior wasn’t “thrill seeking” in that I derived no extra adrenaline-induced pleasure from my surfing (in fact the waves were soft and crappy, but everything is better wetter as they say.

Are there crazed adrenaline junkies who are recklessly pursuing a rush by being reckless? Sure, but what percentage of your workforce is comprised of these people?

We as safety professionals have to stop treating 100% of the population like they are thrill seeking halfwits when less than 1% actually are.  We need to weed those people out of our workplaces (I honestly don’t believe you can coach someone out of daredevil behavior) but we also have to recognize the limits of what we as safety professionals can safely require. Take Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for example.  I know of one safety professional who wanted to require electricians to wear head-to-toe fire resistant clothing while changing light bulbs!  Before you defend this requirement let’s think about this.  While it is certainly possible that one could be burned changing a light bulb, how likely is it that someone changing a light bulb is going to be burned by an arc flash? Given that in my 30+ years working in industrial settings I have never once heard of a case of this happening I am going to say the possibility, while real, is extremely remote.  Add to that the fact that the duration of exposure (how long is a maintenance worker exposed to the possibility of an arch flash from a light fixture (that is supposed to be powered off during the changing)? Some would argue that the length of exposure is considerable, but I think these people are plain dead-ass wrong.  If we were to pie chart all of the activities spent by a maintenance worker the amount of time he or she spends changing light bulbs (in an industrial setting) would probably be so small that it would be unrecognizable on the chart.  Of course, in those cases where there IS an arc flash the severity can be cataclysmic, but there are better ways to mitigate those risks than to require full fire resistant clothing for all maintenance workers. Hell if it is THAT big an issue the organization could simply require it be worn when changing light bulbs.

Too often we exaggerate the risk of a hazard and categorize what is merely possible as probable because it is easier to enforce than if we make an honest assessment.  Some safety professionals, in the name of “zero-injuries” will heap regulation after regulation on a job until the organization rebels and simply refuses to comply.  When it comes to making the workplace safer, the more complex and/or burdensome the solution the far less likely the compliance.  We have to understand that there are limits to the amount of protection we can provide to people and if when exceed the perceived reasonable limits we not only fail to protect in that instance but we lose credibility and jeopardize compliance with safety protocols that are essential for basic safety.

When safety professionals’ risk tolerance is out of alignment with societal norms the safety professional is doomed to a life of frustration.

Lone-Gunman Based Safety

Multiple causes

By Phil La Duke

Ever since Jack Ruby gunned down Lee Harvey Oswald while being transferred from a Dallas police station to county jail debate has raged as to whether or not Oswald acted alone or if he was part of a larger conspiracy. There’s not much satisfaction in the “Lone Gunman” theory; it lacks the panache and high drama of a conspiracy, but beyond that, the Lone Gunman theory seems too simple, too convenient, and too pat. I got thinking about the Lone Gunman theory as it pertains to safety and think the comparison is apt.

I came to realize that most safety professionals see injuries as the result of “Lone Gunman” thinking after listening to yet another argument about the nature of injures. “Injuries are caused by behaviors” “no they’re caused by process flaws” “no they’re caused by…” it sure sounds to me like the people who argue whether or not Oswald acted alone. Sound crazy? Think about it: if you believe that the majority of injuries are caused by a single thing you are essentially dismissing the possibility that worker injuries are caused by a complex situations with multiple and often inter-related cause and effects.

The lone gunman theories are attractive; they boil our problem down to a single factor that we can rigorously attack and solve it. This kind of thinking is satisfying because it means that all we need do is to solve one problem and we don’t have to be distracted by all the other things that may or may not be causing injuries.

Now some reading this will immediately hide behind the fact that they never said that ALL injuries are caused by (fill in the blank) but that MOST injuries are caused by (fill in the blank). That’s a convenient (albeit cowardly) way to stack the deck in your favor but it’s a specious and facile argument, even if we can say with credibility that 99% of injuries are caused by a single cause we have always have that 1% that aren’t and that allows us to dismiss it as an outlier.. Dismissing causes that don’t neatly fit into your view of the world as statistical aberrations or outliers is just another form of calling a fatality an unforeseeable act of God.

No One is So Dangerous as the Man with the Whole World Figured Out

When we start to see any topic with a fanatic’s singularity we become dangerous. If we believe that most injuries are caused by a single cause—whether it be leadership, or culture, or process failures, or human error, or risk taking, or pixies, faeries, and trolls—we create a world where anyone who disagrees must be heretics and heretics must die or at very least publicly mocked behind the walls of anonymity of a LinkedIn discussion thread.

Call Us Legion, For We Are Many

I am distrustful of the “one-size-fits-all” approaches to injury reduction, which let’s face it, isn’t the same as safety and yet many of the programs, snake-oils, and magic bullets our there promise safety and only sometimes deliver injury reduction. It’s dangerous to think in terms of a lone-gunman cause for injuries (even when allowing for the possibility that there could be other lone gunman working simultaneously. The opposite of lone gun thinking is conspiracy theory, which okay, I admit, makes me sound like even more of a whack-job than usual. But for our purposes think of injury causes as being somewhat, or at least potentially, benign by themselves. We interact with hazards every day and in the fast majority of those interactions we don’t get harmed. But the more hazards that are present the greater the probability of injury and the presence of some catalyst causes us to be injured. Think of the straw that broke the camel’s back: up until that last minute the camel was uninjured, but given enough objects loaded onto the camel’s back eventually the camel will exceed its capacity to hold the weight.

There are many things, often working in tandem, that cause injuries and we have to stop arguing over whether the straw broke the camel’s back or whether the man who overloaded the camel was to blame, or whether the camel made poor choices, or whether both camel and man had been poorly trained, or whether we could provide an incentive for the camel’s back not to break and realize that there is seldom only one thing going on, and in most cases hazards work together to achieve a lethal synergy that can maim, cripple, and kill.

We Need To Look for Questions Not Answers

I taught problem solving for many years. One technique we used was called Situation Analysis. This technique is used to solve problems with more than one cause, has inter-related causes and effects, and grew over time. The technique was useful for solving broad problems (like…I don’t know…injuries). What I found interesting is that this technique taught people that if you only focus on one of the causes and ignore the others you won’t really SOLVE the problems you would merely make the symptoms go away until the other causes would cross a threshold causing the problem to return even worse than it had been before. I think of the conundrum of fatalities. Injury rates seem to be going down (although many believe that this is largely the result of under-reporting or more rigorous case management) while fatalities are staying flat or in some cases rising. This is the exact pattern one would expect from methodologies that attack one cause while ignoring others─ the problem seemed to be going away until it roared back worse than ever. It has left safety professionals scratching their heads, but if we attack the lack of safety as a complex problem that has multiple causes that are interrelated we might just be able to manage things better and save some lives.

I’m Not Alone

I know I may sound like a broken record, but when you sell hammers all the world looks like a nail, and while I have heard many say “well BBS is just a tool in my toolbox” (and I use BBS as an example because I hear this more then let’s say “human performance” or “leadership improvement”) I get skeptical. I want to ask what other tools do you use? When do you use them? When is it inappropriate to use them? But I don’t; frankly I’m tired of arguing with fanatics. One bright spot is that I am meeting more and more people who are beginning to think like me. Rockwell, for example, talks about the 3Cs of safety. The 3 C’s are Capital, Compliance, and Culture. Now I’m not here to promote Rockwell but I like where their heads are at on this. I’m over simplifying their spiel here but effectively what they are saying is that you have to consider all three of these things when attacking safety issues. Capital-you have to make capital expenditures to fund projects to improve your equipment. I would expand that to include your facilities as well, but I think their point is well taken. Compliance-let’s not forget that we have to follow the law and that basic compliance is the gateway to more advanced safety solutions. And Culture-hiring qualified organizational development professionals to make substantive changes in how your organization views and values safety is important. To hear Rockwell tell it, you can’t expect great results without looking at all three; I think they are right.

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Where’s the Value In “Safety Day”?

safety day graphic

By Phil LaDuke

Next week I will be conducting the activities surrounding “safety day”. As leader and as a safety practitioner I was the logical selection. The notion of me getting up in front of a group of associates and trumpeting on about safety one day a year may seem laughable to some of my more loyal readers and downright hypocritical to my devoted detractors.

Years ago, as a relatively young man, I made myself a promise: I would never teach or promote something that I myself didn’t believe in or support. That has made it tough in some cases, as I have had a lot of bosses and customers—internal and external—who wanted me to present what at first blush seemed to be propaganda. It sucks having principles. I was true to those principles and pushed back and challenged the presentation sponsors until I was convinced of the value of the topic.

But “safety day”? I mean…come on, right? Doesn’t taking a day to focus on safety mean by implication that there are 364 days where we can take foolish chances, ignore performance inhibitors (thus making more mistakes) and engage in outright recklessness like some sort of misguided version of The Purge?

I’ve done a lot of soul searching and reflecting on the value of having a “safety day” and it may surprise you to learn that I happen to support safety days, health & safety fairs, and similar efforts provided they are done properly. I happen to think these events serve a number of wonderful purposes and can provide real value by:

  • Taking Stock of Safety. Whenever we pursue a goal we need to stop and take a look around every once in a while to ensure that we are making appropriate progress a safety day isn’t about doing something differently (i.e. working safely for a day) but about gauging the effectiveness of what we are doing better. Think of a well-executed safety day as a way of checking your organization’s pulse in terms of safety.
  • Clarifying your safety messaging. We often cling to safety messages that are either inane, soft-headed, or out dated. Having a safety day is a good way to review the messages are delivered and received. You can open a frank dialog about what messages the organization is hearing and compare that to what you had hoped to communicate. On safety day, people tend to feel more comfortable being candid about the real message being sent (“you tell us you want us to stop work when it’s not safe but then you gig us for lost production.”) Instead of arguing about the veracity of people’s opinions, you should listen to what they are saying. Don’t dismiss it as so much hogwash or griping or whining and recognize that when it comes to messaging perception IS reality irrespective of your view of the world.
  • Celebrating your success. Safety is an ugly business with the best news usually being pretty lousy “hey everybody, we didn’t kill anyone last year! Or our injuries are down, huzzah! Huzzah!” Even so, there is usually plenty to celebrate. By focusing not on injury reductions but on positive, proactive behaviors you can generally find something worth celebrating without being trite or contrived. Even if things are looking pretty dismal you can always celebrate your efforts to improve.
  • Recalibrating your tactics. Everyone plays a role in safety, but unfortunately there is no cast in stone recipe for making the workplace safer. Safety day can be a great time to take a look at your tactics and asking all who participate what is working, what is not working, and why? From hear you can recalibrate your safety tactics and, because most of the organization has participated in deciding what should be done, you will have greater buy-in then if the safety committee had made these decisions in a perceived vacuum.
  • Demonstrating commitment. I am giving up a BIG opportunity to make a series of sales calls so that I can lead safety day at my office. Why? Certainly sales are important, and sales I make have a specific and meaningful impact on my success, but I am choosing (as a partner, no one is forcing me to do this) to lead safety day instead. It’s that important to me. Demonstrating commitment is more than waiving your hands around the room and saying “see how much we value safety? We brought in lunch! We are paying you to be here. It’s about making tough choices and putting aside what might be great sales opportunity or an important client meeting to participate in a day focused on the organization’s safety performance and the importance of committing to people and their safety.
  • Modelling behavior. The world loves a hypocrite, and for whatever reason, people tend to take a hard look at safety practitioners for any sign of hypocrisy. I’ve always thought it was because if you could point out that the safety guy is inconsistent or doesn’t walk the talk it absolves you from ever listening to him or her. If safety truly is important than we have to live it, and living it means planning, supporting, and leading safety. Modelling behavior is so important because it tends to be what people end up doing when they are stressed, working unsupervised, or having to make the tough decisions. If people don’t clearly understand and believe that you value safety—above and beyond the other distractions in your life—then they will only value safety when it suits them; when it’s convenient for them.

So while it may surprise, even shock, some of you come Thursday, I won’t be working on client accounts, writing proposals, or flying off to exotic locales to pitch my wares. Instead I will be meeting with a group of people who I like and respect and having a frank conversation about leading safety.

#5s, #88-of-all-injuries-are-caused-by-unsafe-behavior, #accountability, #aerospace, #at-risk-behavior, #attitude, #attitudes-toward-safety, #awareness, #awareness-campaigns, #behavior, #behavior-based-safety, #behavior-observations, #behaviour-based-safety, #branding, #change, #combustible-dust-2, #communications, #construction, #construction-safety, #continuous-improvement, #contract-house-safety, #contractor-safety, #contractor-safety-training, #contractor-training, #core-skills-training, #criticisms-of-bbs, #culture-change, #deconstructing-heinrich, #deming, #distracted-driving, #driving-while-distracted, #edgar-schein, #empowerment, #enforcement, #engagement, #entrepreneur, #fabricating-metalworking, #fabricating-and-metalworking-magazine, #facility-safety-management-magazine, #fleet-safety, #fred-a-maneule, #guiding-behaviors, #happiness, #hazard-management, #health-safety-international, #healthcare, #heinrich-revisited-truisms-or-myths, #heinrich-risk-pyramid, #human-error, #incident-investigation, #increasing-efficiency, #individual-accountability-for-safety, #injury-reporting, #ishn, #james-reason, #jim-raney, #joy, #just-culture, #kan-ban-systems, #line-of-fire, #logistics, #loss-prevention, #manufacturing, #marie-claire-ross, #medical-marijuana, #mining-safety, #mistake-proofing, #mistakes, #national-safety-council, #near-miss-reporting-2, #oil-gas, #oil-and-gas, #operating-efficiency, #organizational-change-2, #organizational-development, #peace, #pedestrian-safety, #performance-improvement, #peter-drucker, #phil-la-duke, #poke-yoke, #prescription-drug-abuse, #process-capability, #process-improvement, #process-safety, #regulations, #reverse-engineering, #risk, #risk-management, #risk-taking, #root-cause-analysis, #rules, #safe-work-culture, #safety, #safety-branding, #safety-culture, #safety-culture-development, #safety-day, #safety-in-the-entertainment-business, #safety-incentives, #safety-observations, #safety-slogans, #safety-tours, #safety-training, #selling-safety, #selling-safety-in-tough-times, #sidney-dekker, #situation-analysis, #situational-analysis, #stop-trying-to-prevent-every-possible-accident, #strategy, #sydney-dekker, #systems-based-safety, #talent-management-2, #temp-agencies, #temp-agency-safety, #temp-safety, #temporary-workers, #temps, #texting-while-driving, #the-enforceable-rule, #the-nature-of-mistakes, #traffic-fatalities, #traffic-safety, #training, #training-safety, #transform-your-safety-communication, #transformational-safety, #values, #variability-in-human-behavior, #why-we-violate-rules, #worker-safety, #worker-safety-net, #workplace-drug-abuse, #workplace-fatalities, #you-cant-fix-stupid

WWPD (What Would Phil Do)?

WWPD

By Phil La Duke

One glance at that title and it would seem I am back in my full arrogant splendor, but I hope you will reserve judgment until you’ve read my explanation. After last week’s post, in addition to the outpouring of sympathy and support, I received a personal, private email. As you may know, it is not my practice to publish or make public things sent to me confidence, so I won’t go into detail about the letter except to say that the author asked the question “WWPD (What Would Phil Do)” The author explained that in many cases throughout the course of doing business he we would ask himself WWPD? He further elucidated that as much as he respected me it was often difficult to arrive at any meaningful answer to the “WWPD?” question. First of all, it is humbling to think that anyone would find my work useful enough to ask that question even once, but the thought that that someone might use it as a means of guiding one’s decisions relative to safety just floored me. At a time when I was considering hanging it up (not just writing, but safety as a profession) and openly questioning whether or not I made any difference at all this was something I genuinely needed to hear.

I have mentioned before my method for improving safety. It has worked consistently for companies large and small and across diverse industries, but I think sometimes I get so caught up in pointing out the misguided efforts so prevalent in our industry that the “WWPD?” gets lost in the cluttered landscape of “WWP Not D?” and so I thought I would once again share what I believe as it pertains to safety improvement.

Let me begin by saying “safety” is an outcome, or more specifically, and “output”. Every process is composed of three kinds of things: inputs (things you start with) transformations (things that happen to them in the course of your process) and outputs (the things you are left with). Whether your process is as simple as tying your shoe or as complex as smelting iron, every process has these three elements. When your process produces unwanted outcomes we call these things “waste” and injuries are precisely that, waste.

For hundreds of years our colleagues in safety have talked about having a “safety process” or “managing safety”, but I have come to believe that such activities have little to do with producing the outcome of safety; at least not directly. Because these activities don’t directly influence safety they tend to be costly and produce very little in way of return on investment. We have to manage the actual work processes to reduce the injuries and produce the state of safety.

The goal of managing a process is to return a consistent, predictable, and desired result. Managing processes involve controlling variability (and unpredictability) in five areas: manpower, machines, materials, methods, and environment.

Manpower

Manpower (sorry ladies this is an old term and I am not going to make it gender-neutral) refers to anything related to people. Ideally we start our process with an uninjured worker that is fit to work. As the process is completed the worker may be transformed (albeit probably not radically) by becoming hot, tired, sweaty, dirty, sore, etc. The change in the worker is not a desired outcome so it is waste.

Machines

Machines can be a simple machine (a screw, incline plane, wheel and axel, lever, pulley or wedge) or complex automated systems. When tools and equipment are worn out or damaged during the process they cannot produce a predictable result.

Materials

Materials refer both to the types of materials used and how they are delivered to the workstation.

Methods

Methods are the “recipe” that the process follows to complete a job. Policies and procedures (including Job Safety Analysis, Standard Work, etc.) are the methods by which we hope to get a predictable and desired result.

Environment

The physical working conditions of the workplace constitute the environment that we must manage to ensure a predictable outcome. Environment can include factors like heat, lighting, and humidity, the presence of exposure risks or biohazards, and similar physical conditions that workers work in and around.

There has been much debate as to whether behaviors are the primary cause of injuries; that’s not really something we had ought not debate. Injuries are most certainly caused by behaviors but so what? We can’t really influence (to any meaningful extent) the behavior of an entire population and pretending that we can has cost inestimable misery in the form of worker injuries and fatalities. But the 5Ms (hey, there’s an M in environment, I never said they STARTED with the letter M) are things that can be managed, and MUST be managed by Operations. It was out of that realization that I created my safety infrastructure framework. Safety can only be achieved by managing the 5Ms, with particular emphasis on:

  • Workers must be skilled in their core tasks and the closer they are to having mastery level skills of how to do their tasks the more likely they are to produce and predictable and safe outcome. Recently I was challenged by someone on this. “So what? Don’t you just need people to be competent to perform their tasks? What does mastery level mean?” Competence, like many things in industry is less a binary component and more a continuum. Much of our means of measuring competence, particularly in Union environments is binary, i.e. “Is the worker able to do the job or not?” We tend to measure whether someone has awareness-level, or a working knowledge of how to do their job instead of mastery. It’s about variation of skill. Someone who can do a job, but only marginally, tends to perform the job with far much more variation than someone who has mastered the job; i.e. someone who can complete a task with very little variation. Most training in core skills trains to the lowest common denominator and once a person has been qualified there is very little effort to assess that person’s skills after the fact. Most companies don’t do a very good job of measuring competency, in fact, few even try. For example, an industrial vehicle driver may receive refresher training, but unless he or she has repeated violations or been involved in multiple incidents little thought is given to whether or not he or she is competent. Furthermore, most companies don’t measure the effectiveness of training beyond a level 2 evaluation (pre- and posttesting, and many are loathe to even do this) which is often more a test of reading comprehension than of actual learning;   this is an issue because competency often degrades over time and there is no way of telling whether or not a worker has sank below the competency threshold. Then there is the related issue of physical competency; how are people evaluated on whether or not they are still physically capable of doing the work without injuring themselves or others? Most organizations address this through annual reviews which are almost entirely focused on performance and attitude than on skills degradation or physical competency. The only cases I know where the fitness to work is even considered are in return to work programs.
  • Process Capability & Discipline. There are two elements of “process” that are key to safety: 1) process capability (how able is your process to return a predictable and repeatable result) and 2) process discipline (how strictly do workers adhere to the process). Companies can really only protect workers when workers do their jobs according to a predictable and robust process. Again I was challenged on this. I was told that this was “clearly not real life—and frankly untrue that a predictable and robust process is the ONLY way to protect workers; there will always be nonstandard situations that need to be managed.” On the face of things this sounds like a fair criticism, but you must consider that while there will always be non-standard situations that need to be managed (in fact, while many companies are loathe to admit it, there are far more nonstandard situations than there should be), but they must be managed using a robust process for managing nonstandard work. We can’t protect workers from things we can’t predict and a process that is out of control makes it impossible to predict what might happen.. One of the keys to managing worker safety lies in having processes and procedures and the discipline for workers to work within these processes. The point of this statement is that companies that don’t care about process variation are far less able to protect workers than companies that work to continuously improve, and thus make more predictable and safe, their processes. We design work and the workplace to be as safe as we possibly can; we employ the Hierarchy of Controls to organize the means of protecting workers but we do so under the assumption that the process is robust and that people aren’t working out of process. This should not be interpreted as saying that we don’t have a responsibility to protect workers in all cases, rather it is meant to underscore the importance of a good process that people follow. When people are unable to follow the process they should not be encouraged to improvise, rather they should be rewarded for stopping work until a safe way of proceeding can be determined.
  • Hazard Incident & Management. Hazard reduction directly correlates to injury reduction. It sounds obvious right? Very obvious – yes? Yes very obvious, and yet one of the single most ignored elements of many safety management systems. Identifying, containing, correcting, and communicating hazards is central to safety; it’s obvious. The problem is that too many organizations treat all hazards equally and as carrying the same potential risk of injury. The risk of working on live equipment without the isolation of energy isn’t as risky as a blocked escape route (all other things being equal). Many organizations are blind to hazards. Without a simple means of managing hazards people become “normal blind” and things that would once have scared them silly now become part of the acceptable, normal landscape and are not only ignored but treated in such a cavalier fashion because “it aint killed nobody yet” that the risk is actually amplified. I don’t see a big distinction between risks and hazards. Clearly we direct need to focus more about controlling risks than on chasing injuries. Risk control is hazard management and vice versa and must be foremost in all safety management approaches, companies have to know the difference between being lucky and being good and to understand that difference one has to understand one’s risk.
  • Accountability Systems. In Just Culture there are three basic behaviors for which people are held to various levels of accountability: human error, risk taking, and recklessness. Human error is the unwanted and unplanned outcome from an unintended action-the honest mistake. Since human error is unintentional there is no point in holding someone accountable for something they can’t control. (I have seen research in healthcare and aviation that puts the number of mistakes the average person makes at 5 an hour). That having been said, there are certain things that individuals CAN control that for which we can and should hold them accountable. These things are conditions that have been demonstrated to inhibit performance and increase the likelihood, frequency, and severity of mistakes. Factors like fatigue, reporting to work ill, stress, drug or alcohol abuse, hang overs, prescription drug use—general fitness to work issues. Obviously, supervision plays a role in whether or not people are allowed to work while impaired by these conditions but in any case these conditions must be confronted and addressed. These performance inhibitors also can influence risk taking. Risk taking in itself is not unwanted. Organizations need people to take risks routinely, but these risks should be informed risks and workers should be coached on the limits to which they are empowered to take risks. When workers take risks because they are improvising they are more at risk for being harmed. As for the reckless, they should be weeded out of the workforce for their safety and the safety of others.
  • Employee Engagement. Workers must be intrinsically driven to make the workplace safer. To do this, workers must be capable of making sound business decisions not relative to safety alone. I think you misinterpret what we mean by making sound business decisions. This isn’t about business acumen as much as workers understanding how what they do impacts, not only their own safety, but the overall success of the organization. Studies have shown that the more highly engaged the worker the more safely the worker is likely to work. And it is tough to build engagement without building knowledge of the business. This knowledge enables workers to make informed suggestions for process improvement and to be a more productive and useful contributor. This takes safety away from being a functional exercise and creates a more holistic approach to safety.

So after all that, What Would Phil Do? This:

  • Invest in competency. This means putting some work into creating better job descriptions, recruiting people who have the grey matter and muscle to do those jobs, and training them to mastery level skill. Once someone has been hired, implement a system to ensure that their skills or physical abilities have degraded to the point that they can no longer safely do the job.
  • Collaborate With The Continuous Improvement Groups.  Not only are improved processes more effective and safe, collaborating with those who are working to make process improvements also make it easy for Operations to see the value of safety.
  • Demand that Leaders Enforce Requirements for Working In Process.  Okay, now sometimes we CAN’T work in process, for example when a manufacture is out of a given part and has to work without it.  But in these cases, Safety should help operations to assess the risks of working out of process and help to find ways to mitigate those risks.
  • Train Leaders.  Front-line supervision is the greatest resource in producing safe outcomes but from everything from core process training to training in Hazard Recognition to coaching workers on their performance this group goes largely ignored and are some of the most incompetent people out there.  They are often selected because they shut up and do their jobs but with no regard to whether they have the skills and experience to effectively supervise others.
  • Shift Focus Away From Injuries Toward Risk.  We spend so much time arguing about whether zero injuries is possible, or whether behavior causes injury or whatever.  We should make it real simple and look for ways to reduce risk in our lives every day.  In the workplace, during the commute, at home with our families.  We can do something about risk BEFORE we get killed or injured which, after all, is the point.
  • Implement A Just Culture System. Just Culture allows people to talk about risk and dumb decisions in a repercussion-less environment.  Until we stop trying to punish people for their mistakes and dumb decisions we can’t really focus on reducing risk.
  • Treat People Like Partners In Safety Not As Our Responsibility. People aren’t quite as stupid, lazy, crazy, careless, or indifferent to their safety as we often treat them. When we learn to respect the people with whom we work and stop treating them like our mentally handicapped children we can partner with them to make the workplace safe.

So…that’s what Phil would do.

#5s, #88-of-all-injuries-are-caused-by-unsafe-behavior, #accountability, #aerospace, #at-risk-behavior, #attitude, #attitudes-toward-safety, #awareness, #behavior, #behavior-based-safety, #behavior-observations, #behaviour-based-safety, #branding, #change, #combustible-dust-2, #construction, #construction-safety, #continuous-improvement, #contract-house-safety, #contractor-safety, #contractor-safety-training, #contractor-training, #core-skills-training, #criticisms-of-bbs, #culture-change, #deconstructing-heinrich, #deming, #distracted-driving, #driving-while-distracted, #edgar-schein, #empowerment, #enforcement, #engagement, #fabricating-metalworking, #fabricating-and-metalworking-magazine, #fleet-safety, #fred-a-maneule, #guiding-behaviors, #happiness, #hazard-management, #healthcare, #heinrich-revisited-truisms-or-myths, #heinrich-risk-pyramid, #human-error, #incident-investigation, #increasing-efficiency, #individual-accountability-for-safety, #injury-reporting, #james-reason, #jim-raney, #joy, #just-culture, #kan-ban-systems, #line-of-fire, #logistics, #loss-prevention, #manufacturing, #mining-safety, #mistake-proofing, #mistakes, #national-safety-council, #near-miss-reporting-2, #oil-gas, #oil-and-gas, #operating-efficiency, #organizational-change-2, #organizational-development, #peace, #pedestrian-safety, #performance-improvement, #peter-drucker, #phil-la-duke, #poke-yoke, #process-capability, #process-improvement, #process-safety, #regulations, #risk, #risk-management, #risk-taking, #root-cause-analysis, #rules, #safe-work-culture, #safety, #safety-branding, #safety-culture, #safety-culture-development, #safety-in-the-entertainment-business, #safety-incentives, #safety-observations, #safety-slogans, #safety-tours, #safety-training, #selling-safety, #selling-safety-in-tough-times, #sidney-dekker, #situation-analysis, #situational-analysis, #stop-trying-to-prevent-every-possible-accident, #strategy, #sydney-dekker, #systems-based-safety, #talent-management-2, #temp-agencies, #temp-agency-safety, #temp-safety, #temporary-workers, #temps, #texting-while-driving, #the-enforceable-rule, #the-nature-of-mistakes, #traffic-fatalities, #traffic-safety, #training, #training-safety, #transformational-safety, #values, #variability-in-human-behavior, #why-we-violate-rules, #worker-safety, #worker-safety-net, #workplace-fatalities, #you-cant-fix-stupid

Maybe You REALLY Can’t Fix Stupid

By Phil La Duke

In a recent blog entry on the blog, Fuel Fix http://fuelfix.com/blog/2014/05/12/human-errors-account-for-80-of-offshore-accidents-exec-says/  Oil & Gas executives were quoted as saying that 80% of offshore accidents were caused by human error.
According to the article, Jim Raney, director of engineering and technology at Anadarko was addressing the Ocean Energy Safety Institute at the University of Houston when he said, “You can’t fix stupid…what’s the answer? A culture of safety. It has to be through leadership and supported through procedures — a safety management system.” I’m careful not to use the stupid brush to tar too many people in worker safety. Are their stupid people out there working? I think it’s safety to say yes. But can we blame 80% of worker injuries on stupidity? I don’t think so, at least not among the rank and file. Let’s face it, if 80% of your injuries are because of human error, as the article later suggests, you have some big issues and I would be careful who you go around calling stupid.
Even Smart People Make Mistakes
I’m not going to beat up on Jim Raney. My guess is that at his level he isn’t doing the incident investigations personally, and therefore he is being fed conclusions by his safety practitioners that lead him to believe that the vast majority of the incidents are because he has a bunch of idiots working for him. But stupidity is not the same as making a mistake, and while everyone makes mistakes (it’s a biological imperative) no one should have to die because of it. If there is stupidity in this process it lies with the person who designed it; he or she either refused to believe that people make mistakes or knew people would invariable make mistakes but refused to protect those that did. Stupid? It’s damned near depraved indifference and gross negligence.
Dispelling the “Operator Error” Myth
For years I taught problem solving courses as part of lean implementations. For generations engineers (the folks typically charged with finding out what caused a quality defect) would ultimately conclude that someone screwed up; the report would conclude that “operator error” was the proximate and root cause. The problem was that the engineer never asked “why?” the operator screwed up. I’ve written reams on performance inhibitors, those things like worker fatigue, stress, distraction, drug use, et el, can cause even the smartest people to make mistakes so I won’t revisit them now. But I wonder how many of those 80% of the people working on offshore rigs had been working long hours without a day off or with inadequate sleep? Keep anyone up for days on end working 16+ hour shifts in the elements and even the brightest among them will seem like a drooling idiot. Simply denouncing the people as stupid and then doing nothing about the system issue will not create a culture of safety, it will create a culture of stupidity. If I can go off on one of my well celebrated tangents for a minute, why are Oil & Gas companies hiring so many stupid people? While you may not be able to fix stupid, you don’t have to hire it, you don’t have to seek out the dumbest in society and offer them a job.
Injuries Are Seldom Caused By a Single Root Cause
A part of the problem solving training that I taught for many years dealt with selecting the right tool from the tool box. Traditional root cause analysis, repetitive whys, and similar tools are designed for use in solving problem of a specific structure and a sudden occurrence, that is to say, issues that develop rapidly and happen in response to a single cause. Situation analysis, fishbone analysis, and other tools, are better used for problems of a general structure and a gradual occurrence, in other words, incidents that are the product of a multiple, inter-related elements. In these types of incidents, many factors have to be present to cause an injury, and it is only after a threshold is reached that we see a process failure. In my experience, injuries tend to be the product of multiple factors that contribute to the incident. As long as we continue to use inappropriate tools to find the cause of injuries we will continue to mask hazards instead of removing them. The fact that Oil & Gas executives are concluding that 80% of the workers’ injuries are caused by “human error” leads me to question their methodology used to identify injury causes. Yes people make mistakes, but if those mistakes are leading to injury you have more at play than stupid people, you also have a process that hurts people when they make mistakes.
Protect the Stupid
We may not all be stupid, but we all do stupid things from time to time—we make poor choices, take unreasonable risks, allow distraction, fatigue, or other factors to impair our performance, or generally act in a way at odds with our safety. Some seem to forget that not all safety is about prevention; probability of interaction is only PART of the formula, there is another key component, reduction of severity. Engineers use this formula when identifying which of the hierarchy of controls to apply to everything from the machines we use in the workplace to the consumer goods we use every day. If the probability of interaction is high (people will almost certainly interact with the hazard) but the severity is low (most of the people who interact with the hazard won’t be seriously injured) they will generally slap a “no-kidding?” warning label on it. But if the probability of interaction is low, but the severity is lethal, they will take greater measures to protect people. I don’t believe that 80% of the Oil & Gas injuries are the fault of stupid people making mistakes; frankly it sounds suspiciously close to Heinrich’s Pyramid. But if the processes used in Oil & Gas are so fragile that human error is going to result in injury, the safety practitioners had better take bold initiatives to make these processes safer.
They Have the Answer; They Just Don’t Know It
The last part of Raney’s statement, “It has to be through leadership and supported through procedures — a safety management system” is right on. Unfortunately, organizations can’t achieve a sustainable safety management system that is built on the belief that you can’t fix stupid. Leadership has to drive good decision making and has to reward and encourage worker engagement based on respect; and describing workers as “stupid” is far from respectful.

#5s, #accountability, #aerospace, #at-risk-behavior, #attitude, #attitudes-toward-safety, #awareness, #behavior, #behavior-based-safety, #behavior-observations, #behaviour-based-safety, #branding, #change, #combustible-dust-2, #construction-safety, #continuous-improvement, #contract-house-safety, #contractor-safety, #contractor-safety-training, #contractor-training, #core-skills-training, #criticisms-of-bbs, #culture-change, #deming, #distracted-driving, #driving-while-distracted, #empowerment, #enforcement, #engagement, #fabricating-metalworking, #fabricating-and-metalworking-magazine, #fleet-safety, #guiding-behaviors, #happiness, #hazard-management, #healthcare, #human-error, #incident-investigation, #increasing-efficiency, #individual-accountability-for-safety, #injury-reporting, #jim-raney, #joy, #just-culture, #kan-ban-systems, #line-of-fire, #logistics, #loss-prevention, #manufacturing, #mining-safety, #mistake-proofing, #mistakes, #national-safety-council, #near-miss-reporting-2, #oil-gas, #oil-and-gas, #operating-efficiency, #organizational-change-2, #organizational-development, #peace, #pedestrian-safety, #performance-improvement, #phil-la-duke, #poke-yoke, #process-capability, #process-improvement, #process-safety, #regulations, #risk, #risk-management, #risk-taking, #root-cause-analysis, #rules, #safe-work-culture, #safety, #safety-branding, #safety-culture, #safety-culture-development, #safety-incentives, #safety-observations, #safety-slogans, #safety-tours, #safety-training, #selling-safety, #selling-safety-in-tough-times, #situation-analysis, #situational-analysis, #stop-trying-to-prevent-every-possible-accident, #systems-based-safety, #talent-management-2, #temp-agencies, #temp-agency-safety, #temp-safety, #temporary-workers, #temps, #texting-while-driving, #the-enforceable-rule, #the-nature-of-mistakes, #traffic-fatalities, #traffic-safety, #training, #training-safety, #transformational-safety, #values, #variability-in-human-behavior, #why-we-violate-rules, #worker-safety, #worker-safety-net, #workplace-fatalities, #you-cant-fix-stupid

Six Simple Ways to Change Your Life

by Phil La Duke

Years ago I worked in talent development for one of the largest faith-based healthcare systems in the United States. I left it to pursue other career goals but it never left me, at least not completely. The system was founded when two religious orders merged after discovering that the youngest among the two orders was 78 years old. They came together to preserve a way of life that had existed over 500 years. Sure it ran hospitals, but more important was the spiritual community that it had created. Faced with extinction it set about an elaborate plan for turning over its legacy to the laity. I always took that very seriously. For me it wasn’t about organizational development or training, although these were certainly a big part of my job, rather it was about preserving a way of life.
Some time ago I shared the podium at the Canadian Society of Safety Engineers with an anthropologist and National Geographic photographer who talked about cultural extinction (which interestingly enough, he attributed to the growth of the written word). According to him, cultures are going extinct at a far faster rate than animals; it’s scary really, thousands of years of knowledge lost as cultures die daily. I was determined that I would do everything in my power to save this one culture to which I had been entrusted.
I wasn’t the only one so entrusted; there were scores of professionals whose primary jobs were to preserve the mission, culture, and vision of the consolidated order. One of the tools they had for preserving the culture was the Guiding Behaviors (note to the grammar vigilantes: I know this sounds like number disagreement but the Guiding Behaviors is considered one tool). As I reflected this morning, as I do every morning, on these behaviors it occurred to me that these would serve the safety professionals as much as anyone else. I have changed the wording of some of these to make them less specific to healthcare, but I doubt the surviving members of the orders will mind too much.

“We support each other in service”
The first of the behaviors is “we support each other in service” what better way for a safety professional to sum up his or her job? We don’t really save lives—not the way doctors or nurses do anyway—but we can always support people in making better decisions and while not directly saving lives influencing people to save their own lives or the lives of a coworker.

“We communicate openly and honestly, respectfully, and directly”
I’ve written volumes about the importance of open and honest communication. I still believe that the only path for safety professionals to get respect is by truly respecting the people and organizations they serve. It’s disappointing how many safety professionals disparage the people they are charged with protecting. People who feel respected tend to respond respectfully. We must always strive, not only to be truthful, but truly honest and not just with the people we serve but with ourselves as well. And let us never confuse hurtful speech with honesty. Before speaking we should ask ourselves, “is what I want to say true? Is it helpful? Is it intended to help someone or merely to make ourselves feel better? And finally, is it necessary?” if all of these things aren’t true then maybe we should just keep it to ourselves.

“We are fully present”
Perhaps the behavior I struggle with the most is “we are fully present”. Being fully present means that you keep your mind on the job—no multitasking, no distractions, no dreaming about the weekend. While it’s easy to see how staying fully present on the job would greatly benefit most workers—distraction on the job can be deadly—we also need to be fully present as safety professionals. This means really participating in meetings and really listening (not just waiting to talk) and working with others to accomplish things. Keeping your head in the game every minute of every day is really tough and if you try to do it you will come home exhausted.
“We are all accountable”
“We are all accountable” means more than holding others accountable, although that is certainly a part of it. We also must strive to hold ourselves accountable. Each day we must ask ourselves if we earned our pay. Did we make a positive impact in people’s lives, not just in the context of safety, but did we make the workplace (and the world) a more pleasant place? Did we really bring our “A” game or did we merely phone it in? We must also remember that we have a duty to be just in holding others accountable. We do not stand in judgment above those we serve, but we owe it to the organization and to the entire population to hold people answerable—both positively and negatively,
“We trust and assume goodness in intentions”
People screw with our work, our day, and our heads on a daily basis. But trusting and assuming goodness in intentions has taught me one of the most powerful lessons of my life: we screw with our own work, our own day, and our own heads far more often than anyone else ever could. They say that forgiveness is a gift we give ourselves and it begins by never taking slight in the first place. Instead of assuming that the Operations leadership is throwing us under the bus we should ask the person some questions. Most often we will find that because we assume that the person meant us no harm and was probably completely unaware of the issues he or she was creating for us. Assuming goodness in intentions brings a person real peace and strengthens relationships. There is a saying that if you keep meeting jerks all day long the jerk is you. I say that if you assume goodness of intention in all you meet you will live in a world like you could never imagine. Send out good stimuli and you receive good responses.
“We are continuous learners”
Too often we strive to teach. We are, after all, the experts in safety and what good is that expertise unless we share it with the organization? We get sad and frustrated when people don’t want to listen to what we have to say. But when we are continuous learners, when we focus not on what we can teach others, but what we can learn from them, we find that we end up teaching other so much more of value than if we were to just spout facts at them. Continuous learning involves a lot of introspection—we have to examine our mistakes and try hard to understand why things went wrong and what we can do to fix things them.
The World Loves a Hypocrite
While I try to live by these simple six statements I don’t always succeed; in fact I fail a lot. But the beauty of these guiding behaviors is that they are things to which I aspire. So now I charge you to share these aspirations with me. Try doing these six things for a week. You may fail, but remember in some cases success comes, not in the outcome, but in the attempt.

#attitude, #attitudes-toward-safety, #behavior-based-safety, #behaviour-based-safety, #change, #criticisms-of-bbs, #culture-change, #driving-while-distracted, #fabricating-and-metalworking-magazine, #happiness, #human-error, #increasing-efficiency, #joy, #mining-safety, #national-safety-council, #oil-and-gas, #operating-efficiency, #organizational-change-2, #peace, #safety-incentives, #stop-trying-to-prevent-every-possible-accident, #worker-safety

Breaking News: Events

Hello all.  I just wanted to issue and “extra” on the blog this week to tell you about some exciting things that I hope you find valuable and will share with your network.

But before I get into that, ISHN listed two of my blog posts as among the most provocative of 2013, so a big thank you to all of you who have supported me for so long, and a big welcome to those of you who have just discovered the blog and are now loyal readers. Because I don’t advertise (most bloggers make their money by taking ads from Google or some other search engine who then drive traffic to the blog; I made a conscious decision to keep my blog advertisement free to protect the integrity of the content.  If I made money doing this I’m afraid I might (perhaps subconsciously) start to self-censor and I don’t think any of you want that) I don’t see anywhere near the number of readers that most blogs do so it’s a real thrill to see so many respected safety professionals and the safety media reading my blog.  Not that you should, but if you wanted to help spread the word about my not-so-humble-but-little-nonetheless blog you can do so in a number of ways by clicking one of the share buttons below, liking a post, or by rating a post (the highest rated posts are then promoted by WordPress.com)

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First of all, Dr. Paul Marciano’s follow up to Carrots and Sticks Don’t WorkSuperTeams: Using the Principles of RESPECT™ to Unleash Explosive Business Performance is due out on April 18, 2014 and can be pre-ordered from Amazon.  Dr. Marciano sent me a pre-release copy for review and I have to tell you it is pretty fantastic.  I like Marciano’s work because unlike a lot of folks from the Ivory Tower of Academia, Paul has a practical, common-sense approach and a conversational writing style that is really inviting.  I pre-ordered my copy yesterday (I know, I know, I already HAVE a copy, but despite my being a completely digital author I’m old-school when it comes to books, I like to have something that I can take with me and read where ever I want).

In my review of his first book, I said that the most important book on worker safety of the 21st century may already have been written, and it’s not a book about safety.  The idea that companies need to build worker engagement (that tendency of workers to do the right thing simply  because it’s the right thing to do) to improve all aspects of the business seemed particularly important to making a safer workplace.  Engagement at all levels has huge implications and any safety professional worth his or her salt should be as much of an expert as possible.  In “Teams” Marciano takes the theories detailed in  first book and shows how they can be put into practice.  I would get a copy for every supervisor in the company (and in case your wondering, I don’t have a financial stake in this, or any stake at all for that matter, I just think this is a very important work), but that’s just me.

His first book went international best seller fairly quickly so I recommend getting a copy quick.

Speaking Gigs You Might Not Want To Miss

My company (well as a parnter, a very small part of it is mine, but I still like saying that) Environmental Resources Management (ERM) is sponsoring a breakfast workshop on March 13, 2014 in Southfield, MI, USA (near Detroit).  The theme of this particular session is Moving Forward: Improving EHS Performance.  I will be sharing the podium with three of my most talented ERM colleagues and each of us will address a different element of Environmental, Safety, and Sustainability.  We will also have a “hot topics” session which I am really looking forward to.  My presentation will be Does Your Safety Culture Foster Strong Performance, but you won’t want to miss any of themThere is no cost for this but space is limited and these events (which by the way ERM sponsors all over the world, except Antartica) fill up really fast, so if you’re interested you will want to register ASAP.  For more details follow this link:

http://view.s4.exacttarget.com/?j=fe9d17707364007c71&m=fe98157076640d7973&ls=fdef1779736c067d72137574&l=fec0107877620674&s=fe2e10717660047b7d1370&jb=ffcf14&ju=fe571d777d64057e7d10&r=0

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And speaking of speaking, I will be presenting Your Mother Doesn’t Work Here: Why Housekeeping Matters at the 75th National Safety Council’s Texas Safety Conference and Expo on April 1, 2010 in Galveston, TX it’s at 8:00 in the morning but if I have to be up, why shouldn’t you?  If you can and do make it, stop by and say hi.
I’ve presented here before and it’s a great event.  While it’s a regional show it tends to have the feel and quality of an international event.  Here is a link to the article I wrote for Fabricating & Metalworking on the same subject:

http://www.fabricatingandmetalworking.com/2013/09/your-mother-doesnt-work-here-why-housekeeping-matters/

For more information:

http://tsce.nsc.org/tsce2014/public/Content.aspx?ID=2170&sortMenu=106000&utm_source=google&utm_medium=CPC&utm_term=safety%20conference&utm_content=safety%20conference&utm_campaign=2014%20Texas%20Conference

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April is just around the corner and that means the Michigan Safety Conference isn’t far off.  This year it is in Lansing, MI and I will be presenting Why We Violate The Rules on Tuesday April 15, 2014 at 10:05 a.m.

This presentation is also based on one of my articles:

http://www.fabricatingandmetalworking.com/2011/05/why-we-violate-the-rules/

and for more information on the Michigan Safety Conference:

http://www.michsafetyconference.org/

What Else?

Twitter

I’m trying to use Twitter more effectively which means that I need to do a better job of scaring up followers, if you would like to follow me on Twitter I have two accounts Philladuke and Workersafetynet.  I’d appreciate any help you can give me in this regard.

Health & Safety International magazine

I have an article coming out in the April 2014 edition of the  UK-based Health & Safety International magazine.  For an online peak, check out: http://www.bay-publishing.com/newsstand.php but you’ll have to wait until April for my article.

ISHN

Also in April, I will have an article published in Industrial Safety and Hygiene News (ISHN), the working title is “The Rise Of the Self-Loathing Safety Professional” and it is sure to raise some hackles. Look for it at http://www.ishn.com/ and be sure and let the editor, Dave Johnson know what you think.

ASSE

Bad news for those of you hoping to see me at the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) national conference; they shot down my last two abstracts, and I’ve decided these two would indeed be my last two submissions for ASSE consideration.  This has been a long time coming and for a lot of reasons.  First of all, participating is all at the speaker’s expense and for the priviledge of speaking at ASSE one recieves a complimentary admission to the show.  The show tends to be in June which is when I am in greatest demand as a speaker and it’s fairly busy for me as a consultant so I end up turning down business year after year to keep a slot open for a gig that doesn’t materialize.  That was in large measure why I was forced to pull out of an engagement at Loss 2010, and I’ve regretted that move. Loss 2010 is far more prestigious and this particular event was in Brugges so I feel like I missed out in favor or ASSE.  At some point one just has to cut one’s losses.

National Safety Council Safety Conference and Expo

I am waiting to hear from the selection committee from the NSC, for abstracts I submitted for its October show in San Diego.  If you haven’t attended this conference in the past you don’t know what you’re missing.  The NSC tends to be a truly international event and draws speakers, exhibitors, and attendees from all over the world.  I’m told that they are seriously interested in several of my abstracts and I hope to be on the podium there (I have exhibited 9 times at the NSC in the past 10 years, so here’s hoping that’s a good sign.)  For information on the NSC conference: http://www.congress.nsc.org/nsc2014/public/enter.aspx

Guest Lectures

I will be guest lecturing this summer at Tulane in New Orleans but the details aren’t quite gelled so watch this space for more info.

Similarly I have agreed to guest lecture at Cooley Law School but I am just in the preliminary stages of discussion.

I typically do guest lectures at universities pro bono, so if you are associated with a university who might like me to guest lecture, please contact me at phil.laduke@erm.com

Private Keynotes

2013 saw me doing more and more keynote speeches for private companies.  Typically I am asked to address leadership meetings, safety summits, etc. but I am just about willing to do anything this side of children’s parties.  If you see a speech that I am making that you are interested in, but cannot attend, you should consider having me in to one of your organization’s meetings.  Again, just drop me a line at phil.laduke@erm.com or call me at 313.244.2525

Consulting & Safety Services

Okay, this is as close to an ad as I’m going to have, but if you like what you read here and think you might find working with me of some benefit consider work with ERM.  ERM has 140 offices in 40 countries and over 6,000 top professionals in Environmental services, Health and Safety  support, and Sustainbility services.  ERM provides the full spectrum of services in all these areas; quite simply we may not be the biggest, but we’re the best.

Check us out at:  www.erm.com

I guess that’s it for now, as you can see there’s a lot of exciting things going on and I am thrilled to be a part of them.  Thanks again to all of you for your support.

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