Phil La Duke's Blog

Fresh perspectives on safety and Performance Improvement

Indicators Are Meaningless Unless They Lead to Managing Performance


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By Phil La Duke

You don’t get great outputs by managing results, you get great outputs by managing performance such that you produce great results. In safety we have spent a century trying to manage outputs and we wonder why our results are less than spectacular. To be sure safety has improved over the past hundred odd years, but this week marks the anniversary of two big events that serve both as an important reminder of how much we have accomplished and of how much work we have yet to complete. March 25 is the anniversary of the Triangle Shirtwaste Factory fire that, in 2011 galvanized the nation and opened the eyes of many about the unsafe working conditions in industry. March 23 saw the anniversary of the explosion and fire at BP’s Texas City refinery. So while a lot has changed and improved in safety Texas City (and the Gulf spill) shows us that we have to be ever vigilant. I won’t draw any more comparison between the two events—to do so would be unfair because there is little similarity between them except that they were safety disasters that killed or injured over a hundred people most of whom did nothing more unsafe than reporting to work that fateful day. But one thing they did have in common is that when it came to safety they managed outcomes. They absolutely made changes to the workplace in light of their respective disasters. They continued as they had done for many years; they managed outcomes.

Most of us continue to manage outcomes despite our fascination with leading indicators we still tend to manage in response to something that has already happened; we react, sometimes without even realizing it. There is an emerging debate as to whether serious injuries/fatalities have the same root causes as more minor injuries and first aid cases. I don’t think that’s the case, that is, I don’t believe that causes of fatalities are significantly different than the causes. What I DO believe is that we tend to be able to reduce minor injuries by managing outcomes but can only prevented by managing performance, not by managing outcomes.

I’ve written about five areas that, if managed properly, will produce safe outcomes. Just to refresh your memories these are:

  • Competency;
  • Process Capability;
  • Hazard and Risk Management;
  • Accountability; and
  • Engagement

To manage our performance in these areas we have to have leading indicators that meaningfully equate to actual peak performance in these respective areas, but also we need to act on the leading indicators to improve performance.

Let’s take a look at just one area for example; the first area where we need to manage performance is competency. When we put people in jobs for which they are not physically or mentally able to perform—not just at the date of hire but through the length of their employment—we put them at risk of acute injuries, long-term ergonomic issues, and of causing other workers to be injured as well. Even if we select workers aptly suited for the tasks we must train them to mastery-level skill level and ultimately we must make periodic assessments of the workers’ continued fitness for duty.

So essentially we need to manage three areas (minimum) for competency: 1) recruiting and screening 2) training and 3) performance management. Unfortunately, most safety practitioners aren’t qualified to judge the effectiveness of any of these areas, so they will have to work with other areas to develop metrics that measure not just whether or not something happened, but also how effective it was. For example, while the number of people trained on time is an important indicator of the importance placed upon training by an organization, what if the training is ineffectual? What if the training is poorly designed “death by PowerPoint” dreck? I’m afraid that we have gotten so enamored with indicators that we have forgotten that the point isn’t a binary “was it done or not?” but to analyze the indicators and intervene. Sure it’s important to know whether or not people received training before they are expected to work production, but it is as important (arguably more important) that those trained are trained effectively.

Leading indicators without any analysis of what the data is telling you and without any intervention to improve the activity is like taking attendance on the Titanic. Sure it’s important to have everyone accounted for, but if you don’t get into the lifeboats there is scarce little value in the exercise.

Many people complain that they can’t find the right leading indicators. Others complain that leading indicators don’t seem to be effective at preventing fatalities. In my experience both complaints are valid. If you don’t have the right indicators, and by the right indicators I mean indications that one of the five areas I mentioned above, you aren’t likely to get good results and if you don’t manage the performance in these areas you may even make matters worse.

To make managing performance for safer outcomes a reality the safety function must partner with other functions to enable and enhance operations. By partnering with groups like Human Resources, Training, and Continuous Improvement the safety function makes the entire organization more effective. As Safety contributes to the overall success of the organization its credibility and influence in the organization will grow and the safety profession will get the respect it deserves.

Managing performance is bigger than safety, in fact managing the five areas will produce more than just safe outcomes it will produce success.

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Safety Slogans Don’t Save Lives


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By Phil La Duke

It’s tough to bring professionalism to a trade that actively looks to make itself look stupid.  There’s only so many hours in the day and only so many resources and if we are wasting either it’s tough to go to the well and ask for help and money. And let’s face it, as safety professionals we to love make fools of ourselves.  On one hand we are perpetual victims, unloved, over-worked, and most of all, under-staffed and under-funded. On the other hand we spend our scarce time and meager resources doing things that don’t reduce the risk of injuries, reduce our operating costs or do really much of anything.  Chief among the waste of time activities that make us look soft- headed goofballs that are completely out of touch with any semblance of reality is the creation and promotion of safety slogans. What is the purpose of safety slogans? Deming specifically signaled out slogans in his tenth point for management, “Eliminate slogans, exhortations, and targets for the work force asking for zero defects and new levels of productivity. Such exhortations only create adversarial relationships, as the bulk of the causes of low quality and low productivity belong to the system and thus lie beyond the power of the work force.” Do safety slogans create adversarial relationships? In way they do.  The fact that we post safety slogans imply that were it not for our little gems of wisdom the great unwashed would stick their entire heads in the machinery.  At their worst, safety slogans patronize and demean the worker.  Am I stating things to strongly? I don’t think so.  Safety slogans don’t raise awareness of safety; it raises and reinforces the awareness that safety professionals think themselves superior to the people who turn wrenches for a living.  It widens the gulf between blue and white collar. And while safety professionals may not recognize Deming for his genius, I think he hit the nail on the head with this point.  If we believe that all but the rarest injuries are the result of either unintended actions (human error/accidents) or poorly calculated risks, then a pithy saying isn’t likely to have much of an effect.

Safety First

Who among you has ever read a safety slogan and thought, “holy crap, I’ve been approaching my life completely wrong, I’m completely turned around on this. I need to make some changes”.  The long and the short of it is that safety slogans serve no purpose, offer no benefit, and yet we devote precious time and money to thinking them up, launching campaigns around them, and promoting them as if they were a crucial part of our efforts to lower risks.

So Why Do It?

Why do we persist in engaging in an activity that does nothing but make us look ridiculous in the eyes of the organization.  And make no mistake, thinking up safety slogans doesn’t garner safety professionals the respect or esteem of the organization simply because they coined the phrase “Safety: It’s Better Than Dying”.  We do it because we like it, and we never asked the question, “is this activity in the furtherance of safety?” Sometimes misguided executives press us to come up with a slogan and eager to curry favor, we rush forward in an orgy of sycophantic fervor, delighted at the exposure to the C-suite.  Trust me when I tell you this is exposure you can do without.  As uncomfortable as it may be, we are better served by declining this request and fetching coffee and bagels instead.  Exposure that perpetuates the C-suite view of safety as simpletons who you call when you want something a kindergarten teacher would refuse to do.  Far better to explain to the executive that your finite time would be better spent engaging in an activity that would return real business results.  Not a lot of safety professionals would feel comfortable speaking up to an executive, but your first interactions with executives set a tone for the relationship; do you want to be taken seriously? It begins here.

What’s Wrong With Having A Little Fun With Safety?

When I have railied against safety slogans before, I invariably get some soft-baked safety guy roll his eyes, smirk and ask, “what’s wrong with having a little fun with safety?”  I am something of an expert in fun (I have had fun that will forever keep me out of any elected office, has gotten me barred from entire countries, and damn near got me killed on multiple occasions), and I am here to tell you that if you think that coming up with safety slogans is fun you are out of your mind; you are doing “fun” completely wrong. I wouldn’t even categorize thinking up safety slogans as amusing or as a brief respite from mind crushing boredom. Let me be clear: I think safety slogans are stupid and make us look like simpletons.  Deming was right, we have got to get rid of them.

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I Factory Rat


By Phil La Duke

This week I conclude my series of posts on safety as an outcome. I began these articles by asking you to rethink safety; to think of it not as a discreet element unto itself, but as the outcome of well-managed business systems, particularly in the areas of competency, process capability, risk and hazard management, accountability, and engagement.

Engagement is one of those words that softheaded HR folks use that makes me nervous. It’s not that engagement isn’t important, in fact, it’s critical, but as Dr. Paul Marciano points out in his books Carrots and Sticks Don’t Work and Super Teams true engagement begins with respect, and I am here to tell you respect is in short supply.

Empowerment, employee involvement, human capital, etc. all sound great, until you get to the root of things and understand that in many cases these words mask the company’s true intentions. The idea that a front-line worker would ever have something worth listening to is an absurd concept to many of the salaried ranks, and the contempt with which many salaried workers feel toward their hourly colleagues is often palpable. Where there should be respect there is condescension, and workers can smell it as surely as whatever they stepped in that is currently stuck to the bottom of their Red Wings.

My view of the world is jaded. In 1985 I took a job working the line at General Motors building seats. I was a hardware installer which meant that I would attach seat locks (a 15 lb piece of rough metal that I would use an air wrench to drive two or three fasteners) to the base of a seat so that the seat back could be slid over the peace and secured to the seat back; I screwed for a living and I came home sore. I would attach 1,600 seat locks on an ordinary shift and 1,800 on an overtime shift. The work was dirty, back breaking, and had numerous hazards associated with it (the company at the time did not require steel toed boots, cut resistant gloves, or safety glasses at the time). In short it wasn’t work that everyone could do, so much so that of the oddly 188 people hired the same day that I was less than 90 made it through the first 90 days. But both inside and outside the plant we were seen as second-class citizens, factory rats. A man who worked the line next to me had earned three masters degrees and when I asked him why he didn’t go to work in one of his fields of study he laughed and said he wasn’t going to take a pay cut.

A lot has changed in the 30 years since I worked that line. Automation has replaced some of the most dangerous jobs. Machine controls and processes have become so much more sophisticated that many shop floor employees are almost skilled trades. But one thing that hasn’t changed that much is the attitude by many salaried employees that the people working the front-line are somehow beneath them, that the lack of a college degree is automatically equivalent to a lack of brains.   The attitude is often subtle but it’s still there, and it is far more prevalent among safety professionals than it should be.

I have heard safety professionals openly malign the front-line workers by questioning their intellectual abilities, and describe them as lazy, stupid, or working in their current roles because they don’t have any other choice. In other cases it is more institutional and insidious. I have been asked to dumb down speeches and even training programs because the average Joe on the shop floor won’t get it. And I’ve been told that unless I compared it to NASCAR most of the people will ignore it. Still other safety professionals think so little of the front-line workers that they have appointed themselves surrogate parents. Its in this climate of condescension that we are expecting workers to rise to the occasion and engage as equal partners in making the workplace safer.

Worker engagement begins with respect and respect begins with confronting our own biases and bigotries. And this is an “us” problem not a “them” problem. Too often in the safety community we blame all our ills on others; the execs don’t do this, production won’t do that. But this is an “us” problem, the only way we can get everyone truly engaged we have to stop acting as if we are the only people who care about safety and the only ones capable of making a difference in safety. We have to stop moaning about how no one will own safety but us and invite others into our world.

It’s impossible to fake respect and until we truly learn to respect all levels of the organization engagement is impossible. So how do we break this cycle? We can begin by expecting more from the shop floor, and warehouses, and shipyards, and steel mills. We can stop acting so surprised when the front-line workers make good suggestions. We can end schmaltzy child safety poster contests and overly parental awareness campaigns. Treat the workers like equals. Ultimately demand great things from workers and engaged workers will deliver.

Filed under: business, Safety, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

A Pyramid By Any Other Name


by Phil La Duke

Tip of the Iceberg --- Image by © Ralph A. Clevenger/CORBIS

In the past weeks I have challenged safety practitioners to view safety differently, to see beyond the fads, the snake oil, and to see safety for what it is, the product of well-managed business practices in the areas of competency, process capability, hazard and risk management, accountability systems, and engagement. I have explored competency and process capability and this week I will take a close look at hazard and risk management.

This topic is by far the most difficult to explore, not because its not well understood, but be cause it is so frequently misunderstood. So many of the basic tenants of safety—when done correctly—support this business element. Unfortunately, so few of these things are done correctly.

Take for example Heinrich’s insufferable pyramid. Safety practitioners all over the world still trot out Heinrich’s Pyramid as proof positive that if you have x number of near misses you will have y number of serious injuries and z number of fatalities. Safety practitioners cling to this concept like a tick on the soft white underbelly of business. But Heinrich’s Pyramid is a steaming pile of crap. Forget that evidence suggest that he may have made his evidence up, forget that no serious researchers (those who don’t collect checks for perpetuating this garbage) believe there is any statistical validity to the pyramid, and forget that Heinrich himself admitted that his research itself consisted of asking 1920’s front-line supervisors how injuries happened ten years or so after they actually happened. Forget all that. The greatest flaw in Heinrich’s Pyramid is that we never really know how many near misses, minor injuries, or unsafe acts there are so effectively we are missing half the information we need to make any meaningful inferences. But there I go again spoiling things for the safety professionals who: a) don’t give a rat’s testicle whether or not the pyramid is valid and b) are too lazy to replace it with something more meaningful.

Of course on the other side of the spectrum we have those who hate Heinrich with the venom and vitriol of the people who hate Heinrich Himmler. This school of thought holds that everything that Heinrich believed is wrong and damaging to the safety organization. These people, I believe, are throwing the baby out with the bathwater. While there is no value in trying to predict the expected number of injuries using Heinrich’s Pyramid, there is value to using the pyramid as an analogy to better help Operations value the benefit of correcting hazards. When forced (which is too often) to incorporate insipid pyramid into a training I am developing or presenting I explain it by saying that we know that for every injury there are numerous hazards that could have harmed us but didn’t, close calls, or minor injuries. We may not be able to use that to predict the number of future injuries but a heck of a lot of hazards represent a heck of a lot of potential for harm. That’s it, no hackneyed lectures about behavior.

Maybe the better analogy would be an iceberg. The above the waterline would be the reported injuries, recordables, DART Injuries, and fatalities and below the waterline would be the hazards, unreported minor injuries, and risk conditions. The point being that if we focus on the hazards before people get hurt we end up reducing the iceberg both above and below the waterline.

Managing hazards is pretty simple (which I’ll bet dollars to doughnuts is the reason so many safety practitioners hate it): find the hazards, contain the hazards, and track the hazard to its permanent correction. Of course implementing this simple process isn’t easy but making it more complex doesn’t make it any easier.

Managing hazards begins with identifying hazards and the best way to do that is to walk the work area and look for things that can hurt people. We don’t need to worry about whether or not the hazard is a physical condition or the result of an ancient curse, or the act of an avenging pagan god. This is not to say that we shouldn’t investigate the causes, but we need to stop obsessing and finding profundity in the ordinary.

Once we have found a hazard we must be sure that we don’t walk away from it without containing it. There is more than just the obvious reason (because someone could get hurt before we get around to it) there is legal liability issues to consider if you find and document a hazard but fail to contain (and record the containment) a hazard.

Tracking the hazard to completion adds another layer to the hazard management process and it provides real value. Meeting weekly to discuss the progress toward correcting hazards helps to build ownership among Operations, it makes the previously invisible visible and applies coercive force on the people responsible for getting things fixed (who often sweep fixing hazards aside for sexier work).

Keeping it simple is an easier sell to the organization than some complex mumbo-jumbo.

Correcting hazards tends to return more on the effort than just reducing injuries. Because we eliminate the root causes of system failures, we likely will eliminate other process bottlenecks that effect cost, quality, delivery, and morale.

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Your Only As Good—and Safe—As Your Process


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by Phil La Duke

Several weeks ago I posted an article that asked you to take a new look at safety. I asked you to consider that safety isn’t something that happens to workers or that doesn’t happen to workers, rather it is an indicator of the efficiency and effectiveness of one of five basic business elements: competency, process capability, management of hazards and risk, accountability, and engagement. In that post I explored the relationship between competency and safe outcomes, and in this week’s post I would like to continue to explore safe outcomes as they pertain to process capability.

I should begin by precisely defining exactly what I mean by process capability. Process capability is the extent to which a process (i.e. an activity designed to produce a predictable desired outcome) as practiced varies from the specification. Your process is not deliberately designed to harm workers so by definition something has gone wrong when someone is injured. Process variability is seen as the principle enemy to efficiency by most process improvement; variability is deviation from the standard and this deviation means that the process is less predictable; the greater the variability the more unpredictable the results and the more hazardous the process.

There is variability in every process; even robots and the best automated equipment are incapable of returning the exact same result in every instance. Typically machine and equipment performance measured in its ability to meet specific limits. Statistical Process Control (SPC) is a discipline developed to improve process reliability (how consistently it performs within control limits) these and other tools can improve process capability and create safe outcomes.

There are obvious things that we can do to improve process capability. For starters, we can develop Standard Work Instructions (SWI). According to the Lean Institute, “Standardized work is one of the most powerful but least used lean tools.” Standard Work involves identifying and documenting the current best practice. In so doing, the organization can identify a) differences between how the work is actually performed and how it was designed, b) the safest way to do the job, and c) identify and document continuous improvements.

Once you have created SWIs you have the means to properly train new employees, evaluate the performance and skill level of existing employees and as I mentioned in the first in this series people who have the skills to do the job are better able to do it safely and correctly. What’s more SWIs allow worker input into workplace improvements. So many organizations have invested in half-baked safety systems that pay workers to watch other people work and provide feedback, why not have them do something productive instead, like…I don’t know…develop Safe Work Instructions?

Standard Work Instructions are more than merely operating instructions, but my intent here is not to give free consulting in Lean Principles. Sufficed to say that investing in standard work improves not only your process but produces safer outcomes. Standardized work isn’t just for manufacturing—it can be applied to everything from driving to dry cleaning—but it is seldom used for non-manufacturing processes even in manufacturing, which is disappointing. Too often organizations resist standardizing non-production work by claiming that it is too difficult. If that were truly the case than how do we ever train anyone to do it?

In my experience a fair amount of workers will resist the very concept of Standardized Work, once when I was teaching a workshop in standardized work one worker indignantly told me that nobody was gonna tell him where he was going to put his (expletive) toolbox. So it’s not that easy to implement standards, of course, I was able to turn it around and win him over by telling him that he was going to tell US where his toolbox should go.

Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) is another great tool for influencing safe outcomes, while the snake oil salesmen will tell you that you don’t need to invest in capital, machines wear out, technology advances, and the design, care, and appropriate maintenance of your equipment is essential. It is outright stupid to believe that you can keep workers safe using outdated, poorly functioning, and wildly unpredictable equipment and, for that matter, battered and crumbling facilities.

Another Lean tool that has a direct influence on safer outputs is 5S, but then I’ve already written ad nauseum on the relationship between workplace organization/housekeeping and its relationship to workplace safety, and given the criticisms of late that I tend to repeat myself, I won’t go into here.

All the best tools and robust processes are of little value, however, if no one follows them. The second element that you have to consider in how process capability influences safer outcomes is “process discipline”, that is, the extent to which people work within the process. We tend to construct safety controls based on what people are supposed to do, and often forget that what happens on paper isn’t necessarily what happens in the workplace. As variable as equipment can be, this variation pales in comparison to the variability of human behavior. No amount of training, hackneyed theories, or the dubious claims from soft-headed safety gurus will change the fact that human behavior is incredibly complex, unpredictable, and rife with variability. This having been said, we need to stop trying to reengineer the human brain and start building engineering controls that protect workers when they make mistakes or even deliberately take unnecessary risks or behave recklessly. We need to recognize that everyone makes mistakes, whether it be human error or poor choices, nobody should have to die because they chose poorly. I know there are people out there who feel differently (shamefully even some people within the safety practice), people who believe that some people, because of their poor decisions deserve to be injured or killed, but for me, killing workers is still bad business.

Filed under: Behavior Based Safety, culture change, Hazard Management, Mistake proofing, process improvement, Worker Safety, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The Lie of Complacency


by Phil La Duke

complacency

In this week’s post, I was going to continue exploring the antecedent processes that organizations must manage if they hope to ensure safe outcomes, but I got distracted by a recent contention by a leading vendor of safety training that 80% of all injuries are caused by complacency. I have been hearing this more and more lately and it is driving me nuts. First of all, I question the basis for that contention. Several sources claim to have reached this conclusion based on research, but I suspect that they know about the scientific method as I do about piloting a zeppelin, which is to say zilch.

What is the Ahabesque obsession that safety people have with finding the single cause (or the most common cause) of injuries? The cynic in me wants to point out that companies whose business model depends on the perpetuation of a given hypothesis are likely to preserve it at all costs, but I think it goes deeper than that.

To begin with there is the real problem that most of these people have differentiating between qualitative and quantitative data; it’s a problem that used to be common in the quality function. Qualitative data is measured while quantitative data is counted. When we talk about the cause of injuries we need to consider qualitative data not quantitative data, in other words, it doesn’t matter what the most common cause of injuries are, what matters is what is the most serious threat to workers. Let me give you an example, the following chart represents the locations on the site that have the most injuries:

 injuries pareto

If you look at this chart it is easy to assume that your efforts should be spent at the Memphis facility, but because this is quantitative (counted) data and not qualitative (measured) data we aren’t making informed decisions. What if , for example, the injuries at the Memphis facility are predominately first aid cases, but the Charlotte facility are predominately fatalities? Does it still make sense to attack first aid cases or is it smarter to address the problems at the Charlotte facility?

So even if complacency is the cause of 80% of worker injuries (and PLEASE share with us the industry, country, time period, research methods, population, culture, etc. that these studies on which this conclusion was made), it doesn’t mean that attacking complacency alone will solve the problem, because what percent of our injuries are relatively minor and what percentage are killing people?

But specifically the idea that complacency is the primary cause of injuries is problematic. This company and those like them, would you have believe that there is one overwhelmingly widespread cause that transcends all industries, worksites, and environments is ludicrous to the extreme, and convenient if you are selling a methodology that is based on this specious argument.

Why am I so suspicious? Well let’s start with the definition of “complacency”. According to dictionary.com “complacency” is 1. a feeling of quiet pleasure or security, often while unaware of some potential danger, defect, or the like; self-satisfaction or smug satisfaction with an existing situation, condition, etc. Is this really 80% of the causes of injuries? Are people dying from exposure to poison gases because they are smugly satisfied? Are workers being maimed because they feel comfortable doing their jobs? Who thinks up this softheaded rhetoric and successfully builds a billion dollar industry around it? And what is wrong with us that we so blithely buy this snake oil? To quote Kermit the Frog, “Somebody thought of that and someone believed it and look what we’ve done so far” of course Kermit was talking about wishing on stars, but he might as well have been talking about the latest safety methodology.

Another element that works against this thinking is the assumption that our anecdotal experiences and observations are universal. Once again, this is great for companies who sell a single tool solution (or single premise) but for those of us who are on the receiving end it can be lethal or even fatal. As I pointed out in my post about Lone Gunman safety, we have to as a profession accept that there are multiple causes for injuries and the more we look for that single cause the more we delude ourselves into thinking that there is some kind of magic bullet solution.

Injuring workers is a complex problem and we have to resist the temptation to get sucked into some con game where a slick-talking salesman convinces us that we only have to…and all our problems will be solved.

Beyond all that let us suppose that complacency really is this hidden killer, what are we to do about it? Awareness campaigns? I used to work in the nuclear industry and knew plenty of people who grew complacent with the dangers of exposure to radioactivity, but they still didn’t take chances or short cuts. An awareness campaign or retraining them would have made no difference—the opposite of complacency isn’t awareness it’s anxiety. So would the people preaching that the greatest threat to worker safety is complacency really suggest that we increase the anxiety of the worker? Would they have us believe that a stressed and worried worker is safer than one who is relatively relaxed? Keep in mind that a stressed out worker is far more likely to commit errors and take unnecessary risks than the worker who is not stressed out. Add to that the stress produced by constantly reminding people to pay attention or to stay focused and you have people adding risk to the process in the name of safety.

Complacency is a danger on one way—complacent safety professionals who think they are doing a better job than they are. If complacency is responsible for 80% of injuries, maybe it’s the complacency of the safety practitioner.

Filed under: Awareness, Safety, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Taking a New Look At Safety


fresh look

By Phil La Duke

 Let me begin by thanking all of you who voiced your support for me over the past week. As you may have surmised I get frustrated from time to time, mostly because so many safety practitioners still don’t get it—despite cognizant arguments (I’m not talking about what I have been saying, I’m arrogant but I’m not THAT arrogant) made by really smart people so many in the field of safety cling to shear stupidity. Arguing a point that should have been conceded long ago gets exhausting and it got to me. Add to that a moderate case of writer’s block and it’s been a rough couple of weeks.

But enough about that, some time ago I posted an article that postulated that safety in itself wasn’t something we should be managing, that safety is an outcome not a priority or a factor or…fill in the blank. Safety isn’t what happens to or doesn’t happen to workers it’s an indicator of business efficiency. We have to view safety in a radically different way and I realize going into this upset some of the delicate sensibilities of some in the safety community, but safety cannot be effective on a functional level, it needs to be managed by operations. Operations ownership of safety isn’t a new idea, and certainly not a radical change, but what I am suggesting is more than simply moving a corporate function out of administration or compliance to under Operations leadership. What I am suggesting is that Operations needs to view safety as an indicator of the health of the organization, as a criterion for judging the effectiveness of Operations management.

If safety is truly a value (and it really should be) than what is it that we are valuing? A lack of injuries? Can we really say that is a value? But let’s back up. “Value” is one of those words that simpletons bandy about without really having a clear understanding of the definition of the word. I realize that in the age of Wikipedia people feel that it is an inalienable right to assign whatever definition they want to a word; sorry imbeciles it doesn’t work that way. “Values” are your personal code of beliefs, and one of the elements of a culture is “shared values”, that is, the most deeply held belief set that guides our decisions. So if “safety” is a core value it should guide our decisions as we manage our operations in five[1] key areas: Competency, process capability, hazard management, accountability, and engagement. This week I would like to tackle competency.

I tend to boil this down to a single statement: “if people don’t have the skills to do their jobs they can’t do them safely.” I stand by this, and it makes for a great “elevator speech”[2] but there is so much more to this. Recruiters have to find the right people to do the job, people capable—physically, mentally, and emotionally—of doing the job as designed. There is a lot of cowardice in recruiting and many in Human Resources will hide behind antidiscrimination laws for not doing a thorough job of screening people for their ability of inability to do the job without hurting themselves or others. The difficulty in hiring the right people isn’t completely the fault of recruiters. In many organizations the jobs are so poorly defined that it is for all intents and purposes impossible to identify which skills and abilities are bona fide job requirements. Companies, often abetted by misguided hackneyed legal advice deliberately add competency-risk to their organization because they are afraid someone will use his or her job description as a shield. In a well-managed organization competencies are mapped so specifically that an intern can see the skills and experiences that he or she would need to master/acquire to become CEO. Before you scoff and pooh-pooh the idea as nonsense, I developed such a system for a large, tier-one Automotive supplier, not only did it help in succession planning, but it helped individuals to own their own careers, and yes, an output of a good competency management system is a safer operating environment. Competency cannot stop at the date of hire.

There is seldom, if ever, a perfect hire. Even in the best case there is at least some gap between a new-hire’s skill set and the requirements to expertly do the job. Unfortunately, in most companies the training department doesn’t do individual placement testing to ascertain a new-hire’s true competency level and tends to train to the lowest common denominator (which here again they really can’t know without testing) and over train, often with a schlocky eLearning module that is about much like actual skill building as I am like a flamenco dancer. So there is much work to be done to increase true competency in our hiring and training process.

And it doesn’t end there, once someone has been hired and appropriately trained, there is still a large degradation of skills and behavioral drift where people move away from the established process, so the organization has to have a strong performance evaluation process that focuses on performance improvement and not on pay increases or cover your assets thinking that pervades so many performance evaluation processes. At this point you’re probably seeing where there begins to be overlap between the five antecedent processes. You can probably also connect the dots between getting these basic management practices right. Not only will the organization see it’s safety increase, but in all the other business elements as well.

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[1] I used to have seven, I have colleagues who have identified ten, others who have as many as 35, but I’ve found that much more than five of anything confounds the organization so I simplified mine to five

[2] If someone ever gave me a little speech about what they do while I was riding in an elevator I would be tempted to smack them, but I digress.

Filed under: Worker Safety, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Discouraging Workers from Reporting Injuries Is Bad Business


Paperwork

By Phil La Duke

Under-reporting injuries is a poor business practice bordering on criminal behavior. Nowhere was this better evidence than when the U.S. government leveed a whopping $70 million fine on Honda of America for doing just that. In what The New York Times describes as a “sharp escalation of penalties against automakers that skirt safety laws” Honda Fined for Violations of Safety Law, Honda was fined for not reporting consumer injuries and deaths caused by quality defects and for not reporting the defects themselves. Last year, General Motors faced similar sanctions.

It’s worth noting that neither company has been accused (at least formally) of underreporting worker injuries, but is that such a stretch? General Motors has consistently reported one of the best safety records in industry and Honda of America hasn’t made OSHA’s radar since 1999 when one of its contractors were fined over $1 million for machine guarding issues.

All that having been said, is it a stretch to believe that companies that deliberately lie to and one branch of the government (the Department of Transportation) about public safety might not also lie to another branch of the government (OSHA) about the safety of its workers? How confidant are you that companies that do not report one set of data (in this case public deaths and defect claims) that is publicly available and can easily be discovered will willingly and openly and accurately report injuries that happen under the shroud of company secrecy? We talk a lot about indicators in this business and to me there is a strong correlation between cooking one set of books and the likelihood that another set of books is equally cooked.

Rumor has it that underreporting is an area of increasing concern among OSHA inspectors and that companies can expect stricter penalties for underreporting.

Underreporting potentially poses a much more serious threat to worker safety than injuries themselves. When a worker is injured it provides the company with irrefutable evidence that safety is not present in the workplace, assuming you define, as most persist in doing, safety as the absence of injuries. As horrible as it is to have workplace injuries the silver lining is that a heretofore-unknown hazard is revealed and can be rectified; not so if the injury goes unreported and unknown.

Companies need not hatch any insidious plot to conceal injuries in most cases thirty years or more of hackneyed incentive programs and half-baked schemes from safety pundits have created a culture where injuries are taboo and only those injuries that cannot be manipulated via case management are reported.

It’s no accident that recordable injuries are falling while fatalities are staying flat (or in some industries actually rising)—it’s tough to turn a corpse into a first aid case no matter how creative you are. Case management has become a crucial part of the safety management system and it should be. No one should be allowed to fraudulently file injury claims in an attempt to cheat the system, but then again, as loathsome as it is, the company has to balance the cost of fighting the cost of fraud against the actual cost of the fraud. This is well known in the insurance and legal communities where it is common practice to settle a dubious lawsuit rather than face a lengthy and costly legal battle. And yet companies still invest considerable sums into case management. Why? Is fraud so widespread that something has to be done or western civilization itself would collapse? No, at least according to studies cited by Lisa Cullen in her article The Myth of Workers’ Compensation Fraud only 1–2% of Worker Compensation claims are fraudulent. So why do so many companies continue to fund Case Management efforts. Is it fiscally responsible to invest money disputing claims when only 2% or less are fraudulent? Not unless disputing claims serves some other, more profitable purpose. In the instance of case management the purpose is clear (although seldom admitted): reducing recordable injuries. I know of cases where companies have sent representatives to the clinic with injured employees to instruct the medical professionals in how to treat an injuries—weighing in on everything from the type of pain reliever used to whether to suture a cut or to close it using butterfly bandages. Such practices smack of questionable ethics but are widespread nonetheless.

Some efforts that discourage injury reporting are less malignant in intent but are just as damaging to the overall efforts to reduce risk. Companies routinely sponsor incentive programs for workers to not get hurt. If that phrasing sounds odd to you it should. When you provide incentive for someone not to do something that they can’t control and aren’t doing on purpose, what message are you sending? When you provide incentive for something beyond one’s control—whether that be injuries or sales—the only true incentive is to cheat and lie. The incentive in the case of zero injury rewards is to underreport.

One can take this effort to discourage reporting injuries even further and pit worker against worker through “behavior observations” which in effect vilify the injured worker; the injured worker spoils the Safety BINGO, and may even cost coworkers their bonuses. The coercive pressure to conceal workplace injuries can be overwhelming.

We talk a lot about changing the culture and about how workers need to change how they view safety, but maybe the cultural change needs to be in who we view injury and injury reporting. If we as organizations and individuals truly value safety we have to stop pretending that condoning injuries provided that they aren’t recordable injuries is the same thing as valuing safety.

Filed under: Behavior Based Safety, Injury reporting, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Lone-Gunman Based Safety


Multiple causes

By Phil La Duke

Ever since Jack Ruby gunned down Lee Harvey Oswald while being transferred from a Dallas police station to county jail debate has raged as to whether or not Oswald acted alone or if he was part of a larger conspiracy. There’s not much satisfaction in the “Lone Gunman” theory; it lacks the panache and high drama of a conspiracy, but beyond that, the Lone Gunman theory seems too simple, too convenient, and too pat. I got thinking about the Lone Gunman theory as it pertains to safety and think the comparison is apt.

I came to realize that most safety professionals see injuries as the result of “Lone Gunman” thinking after listening to yet another argument about the nature of injures. “Injuries are caused by behaviors” “no they’re caused by process flaws” “no they’re caused by…” it sure sounds to me like the people who argue whether or not Oswald acted alone. Sound crazy? Think about it: if you believe that the majority of injuries are caused by a single thing you are essentially dismissing the possibility that worker injuries are caused by a complex situations with multiple and often inter-related cause and effects.

The lone gunman theories are attractive; they boil our problem down to a single factor that we can rigorously attack and solve it. This kind of thinking is satisfying because it means that all we need do is to solve one problem and we don’t have to be distracted by all the other things that may or may not be causing injuries.

Now some reading this will immediately hide behind the fact that they never said that ALL injuries are caused by (fill in the blank) but that MOST injuries are caused by (fill in the blank). That’s a convenient (albeit cowardly) way to stack the deck in your favor but it’s a specious and facile argument, even if we can say with credibility that 99% of injuries are caused by a single cause we have always have that 1% that aren’t and that allows us to dismiss it as an outlier.. Dismissing causes that don’t neatly fit into your view of the world as statistical aberrations or outliers is just another form of calling a fatality an unforeseeable act of God.

No One is So Dangerous as the Man with the Whole World Figured Out

When we start to see any topic with a fanatic’s singularity we become dangerous. If we believe that most injuries are caused by a single cause—whether it be leadership, or culture, or process failures, or human error, or risk taking, or pixies, faeries, and trolls—we create a world where anyone who disagrees must be heretics and heretics must die or at very least publicly mocked behind the walls of anonymity of a LinkedIn discussion thread.

Call Us Legion, For We Are Many

I am distrustful of the “one-size-fits-all” approaches to injury reduction, which let’s face it, isn’t the same as safety and yet many of the programs, snake-oils, and magic bullets our there promise safety and only sometimes deliver injury reduction. It’s dangerous to think in terms of a lone-gunman cause for injuries (even when allowing for the possibility that there could be other lone gunman working simultaneously. The opposite of lone gun thinking is conspiracy theory, which okay, I admit, makes me sound like even more of a whack-job than usual. But for our purposes think of injury causes as being somewhat, or at least potentially, benign by themselves. We interact with hazards every day and in the fast majority of those interactions we don’t get harmed. But the more hazards that are present the greater the probability of injury and the presence of some catalyst causes us to be injured. Think of the straw that broke the camel’s back: up until that last minute the camel was uninjured, but given enough objects loaded onto the camel’s back eventually the camel will exceed its capacity to hold the weight.

There are many things, often working in tandem, that cause injuries and we have to stop arguing over whether the straw broke the camel’s back or whether the man who overloaded the camel was to blame, or whether the camel made poor choices, or whether both camel and man had been poorly trained, or whether we could provide an incentive for the camel’s back not to break and realize that there is seldom only one thing going on, and in most cases hazards work together to achieve a lethal synergy that can maim, cripple, and kill.

We Need To Look for Questions Not Answers

I taught problem solving for many years. One technique we used was called Situation Analysis. This technique is used to solve problems with more than one cause, has inter-related causes and effects, and grew over time. The technique was useful for solving broad problems (like…I don’t know…injuries). What I found interesting is that this technique taught people that if you only focus on one of the causes and ignore the others you won’t really SOLVE the problems you would merely make the symptoms go away until the other causes would cross a threshold causing the problem to return even worse than it had been before. I think of the conundrum of fatalities. Injury rates seem to be going down (although many believe that this is largely the result of under-reporting or more rigorous case management) while fatalities are staying flat or in some cases rising. This is the exact pattern one would expect from methodologies that attack one cause while ignoring others─ the problem seemed to be going away until it roared back worse than ever. It has left safety professionals scratching their heads, but if we attack the lack of safety as a complex problem that has multiple causes that are interrelated we might just be able to manage things better and save some lives.

I’m Not Alone

I know I may sound like a broken record, but when you sell hammers all the world looks like a nail, and while I have heard many say “well BBS is just a tool in my toolbox” (and I use BBS as an example because I hear this more then let’s say “human performance” or “leadership improvement”) I get skeptical. I want to ask what other tools do you use? When do you use them? When is it inappropriate to use them? But I don’t; frankly I’m tired of arguing with fanatics. One bright spot is that I am meeting more and more people who are beginning to think like me. Rockwell, for example, talks about the 3Cs of safety. The 3 C’s are Capital, Compliance, and Culture. Now I’m not here to promote Rockwell but I like where their heads are at on this. I’m over simplifying their spiel here but effectively what they are saying is that you have to consider all three of these things when attacking safety issues. Capital-you have to make capital expenditures to fund projects to improve your equipment. I would expand that to include your facilities as well, but I think their point is well taken. Compliance-let’s not forget that we have to follow the law and that basic compliance is the gateway to more advanced safety solutions. And Culture-hiring qualified organizational development professionals to make substantive changes in how your organization views and values safety is important. To hear Rockwell tell it, you can’t expect great results without looking at all three; I think they are right.

Filed under: Safety, Safety Culture, Phil La Duke, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

2014 New Year’s Resolutions for Safety Professionals


by Phil LaDuke

Last year I wrote a list of New Year’s resolutions for Safety Professionals. The piece proved popular and people this time of year seem to come looking for them. I decided to write this piece without looking at the previous list and after doing so taking a look at them to see if I am capable of any sort of growth. 2014 has been a rough year for me. I lost my father-in-law and one of my few remaining uncles to work-related illness and despite by best efforts through writing and speaking and working I don’t seem to have changed anything, not a single mind. But this time of year makes the best of us reflective and after doing some soul searching and reflecting I came up with a short list of things I think we as professionals can do to be even more effective:

  1. Seek first to understand before seeking to be understood. Okay, I borrowed this one from St. Frances of Assisi but I think safety practitioners need to adopt it, especially those of us who sell safety services and solutions. We need to listen to the organization and ask probing questions—not in an attempt to lead people to our preordained solutions but so that we can understand their pain points, we cannot solve a problem that we don’t fully understand.
  2. Keep things simple. When we offer advice we need to do so because we truly want the other to benefit from our wisdom and experience not because we want to show off or demonstrate our brilliance. The best advice I have received in life was simply stated and to the point. Perhaps the absolute best advice ever given me was a single word, “stop” (my friend Ken said to me as I was about to mindlessly walk into the path of speeding Chicago traffic). We don’t need to write grand, self-serving treatises to be effective.

We have become a profession of theorists who, when proven wrong, change the rules. We need to get back to basics, as my boss if fond of saying “the best companies get the basics right and they get them right every time”. So what are the basics? Competency, Risk Management, Process Capability, Accountability and Engagement. But on an even more basic level we need to tackle the basics of hazard identification, containment, correction, and communication.

  1. Be kind. I know it may sound hypocritical of me to preach kindness but as a wise man once said to me, “make the day, don’t let the day make you”. To a large extent what we send out comes back to us and when we are kind people are more likely to be persuaded by us than when we are jerks. Besides, being the safety jerk is my job. When someone has been injured they are particularly vulnerable, “I told you so” or “you should have…” never soothed an injured worker.
  2. Serve the Organization. I spent last weekend poring over incident reports and Workers’ Compensation reports and I was struck by how often we assume the injury was intentional until proven otherwise. Are their liars and cheats who want to fake claims? Sure, but far more of the injured are victims and if we just lived our lives in service to the organization instead of standing in judgment of the injured we would see that most injuries are painful, embarrassing moments in the lives of workers. Do we have to protect the company against fraud? Absolutely, but let’s resolve to do so without treating everyone as criminals.
  3. Collaborate. We cannot be successful trying to do this alone and we have to swallow our pride and reach out to other disciplines. I have seen so many safety professionals wrestling for control with the continuous improvement group only to have both groups remain impotent in the organization. Reach out and help someone and ask for help in return; at the end of the day we’re all in this together.
  4. Teach. To be truly safe workers need to be able to do their jobs and they need to have mastered their jobs. I wrote this to a safety executive once and he wrote me back with scorn. “Why do they have to master their jobs?” he scoffed at me. I resolved right then and there never to do business with him. I don’t think he can be reached and if he can learn, he cannot learn from me.
    But in answer to his question, why do they have to master their job? Because the level of mastery of one’s job equates to the level of risk one operates under while working. Workers who don’t know how to do their jobs—or our just marginally competent—are far more likely to be injured or to injure another worker. This is most acutely evident in how companies view training temporary workers; in the minds of many better to kill a temp than to waste money training one. It’s ugly, but it’s true.
  5. The more we sharpen our skills as safety professionals the more good we can do, but I’m not talking about learning the latest safety fad. We need to learn how our businesses work, how our organizations survive, and how our companies make money. We can’t change anything unless we know how our businesses work. Instead of going to the same tired professional conferences and hearing the same tired speeches from the same tired hucksters why not attend a business seminar, or a Lean Management course? You will be a better professional for it.
  6. Safety is a tough way to make a buck, and it’s getting tougher. Hang in there, this isn’t a job for quitters.

Last year I gave you 10, but this year only eight. But I will make you a bargain. If you do these eight come see me and I’ll give you another 10.

Filed under: Safety, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

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